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Shadows of Ethics: Criticism and the Just Society by Geoffrey Harpham. Durham
and London: Duke University Press, 1999. Pp. xiv  263. $54.95 cloth;
$19.95 paper.
If you are of the party that believes that most writing on ethics is plagued
by a self-congratulatory earnestness, then this is the book for you. Shadows of
Ethics is a rich, elegant work with a skeptical sensibility and a wonderful sense
of proportion. Defining ethics as ‘‘the site of a desire for a clean conscience’’
(xiii), Geoffrey Harpham argues for the unsurpassability of the Kantian imper-
ative (even in many who claim to disdain it), the impossibility of fulfilling that
imperative, and the undesirability of taking it too literally.
This argument is not made in a direct or repetitive way throughout the
book, which is a series of thirteen discrete essays, nine of which have been
previously published. The connections between chapters are often oblique,
and many of the individual chapters stand alone quite well, particularly the
critiques of individual writers and the essay on Enlightenment and modernity.
The book’s second chapter, ‘‘Ethics in Literary Study,’’ will be the most familiar
to many readers, having appeared as the entry on ‘‘Ethics’’ in the Lentricchia/
McLaughlin collection Critical Terms for Literary Study. The essay makes two
well-known claims. The first is that ‘‘On or about December 1, 1987, the na-
ture of literary theory changed’’ (20). However witty or ironic this is meant to
sound, it presents an unfortunately trivializing history of literary theory, sug-
gesting that somehow it was only with the revelation of de Man’s wartime writ-
ings that theorists realized that the world was a serious place. Harpham’s other
succinct and familiar claim in this chapter, that narrative ‘‘negotiates the rela-
tion . . . of the is and the ought’’ (36) is a far more productive insight. Harp-
ham nicely shows how this formula subsumes the question in narrative theory
of which comes first, the reader or the text, and makes this an ethical, rather
than a strictly formal problem. It is entirely plausible that this model could be
applied to other modes of formalist reading in order to show the centrality of
ethical concerns even when they seem to be invisible.
In Chapter Three, Harpham takes the fact/value dilemma from Hume (be-
ginning with a brief reading of Hume’s text that shows that Hume himself is
more ambivalent, and unsuccessful, in making this distinction than a unified
critical heritage that makes him into the guarantor of the difference thinks he
is) into an observation about a governing structural paradigm of criticism: that
critics inevitably construct the truth of their own analyses by presenting their
own work as fact, the ‘‘is’’ (a site of ‘‘necessity, obligation facticity’’) observing
value, an ‘‘ought’’ (a site of ‘‘freedom, choice and desire’’ [48]). Harpham’s ex-
amples in this essay are Terry Eagleton’s critique of Lyotard and Susan Stew-
art’s reading of the Meese Report on pornography, but he obviously realizes
.......................... 9672$$ $CH4 09-06-02 14:28:22 PS
68 Criticism, Vol. 44, No. 1: Book Reviews
that the same charge can be leveled against his own meta-analysis: that by un-
covering the evaluative choices made by Eagleton and Stewart, he positions
himself as the ‘‘is’’ to their ‘‘oughts.’’ His conclusion to the essay neatly frames
the issue: ‘‘not only is this the way it is,’’ Harpham allows, but ‘‘the way it
ought to be’’ (49). If Hume could not separate fact and value, neither will
Harpham.
Harpham plays this distinction to much higher stakes in what is perhaps
the most substantive essay in the volume, ‘‘So . . . What Is Enlightenment?
An Inquisition into Modernity.’’ This essay takes Foucault’s late essay ‘‘What
Is Enlightenment?’’ as its springboard and challenges the confident ‘‘voice of
modernity’’ that makes a clear distinction between Enlightenment and the
darkest technology of premodern truth, the Inquisition. Layering Foucault’s
close readings of Kant with a survey of the practices and apologists for the
Inquisition, Harpham comes to a Foucauldian comparison of the coherence of
the ‘‘political rationale for the Inquisition’’ against the ‘‘fatuous Enlightenment
assertion of a free private realm secured by submission in a public realm by
which it is magically untouched’’ to come to the conclusion that ‘‘The Inquisi-
tion is, perhaps, Enlightenment without denial’’ (90–91). And if that observa-
tion seems too comfortably set in an Adornian distance, Harpham brings it to
bear on the protocols of the enlightened scholarly profession. What would the
result be, he wonders, of a ‘‘psychopathology of scholarship’’ that would show
how ‘‘findings,’’ ‘‘conclusions,’’ and ‘‘results’’ are inevitably presented as the re-
sult of ‘‘a suffering that is both genuinely painful and eagerly desired’’ (97); in
other words, where is the line between inquiry and inquisition? When Har-
pham asks if we are the heirs of Enlightenment or its Other, he makes it im-
possible to maintain a comfortable distinction between those alternatives.
Five of the later chapters in the book are focused on individual writers:
Robert Nozick, Martha Nussbaum, Geoffrey Hartman, Fredric Jameson, and
Noam Chomsky. The variety of disciplines on display here—two philoso-
phers, two literary critics, and a linguist—gives some inclination of the range
of Harpham’s reference, which is one of the greatest strengths of the book.
When Harpham surveys Chomsky’s life and writings and wonders why
Chomsky has been so little read by literary theorists, or produces an essay on
the legacy of Enlightenment that moves gracefully from Kant to Lyotard, Fou-
cault, Norris, Eagleton, Benjamin and de Man in order to constuct a lurid his-
tory of the entanglement of Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment, or
reviews the careers of Homi Bhabha and Judith Butler in two pages as exam-
ples of the postmodern, oppositional intellectual, he displays an erudition that
is both vast and lightly worn. The rhetoric of his assessments of individual
writers is, to borrow his own description of Derrida, a rhetoric of ‘‘attention and
nonassertion’’; nevertheless, the chapters on Hartman, Jameson, and Chomsky
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turn out to be deeply respectful, even poignant analyses that assess these writ-
ers in terms that connect the personal and the professional. Taking the ethical
and political concerns expressed by these writers as their central desires, Har-
pham looks for the connections between those desires and the impact these
critics have had on contemporary thought.
The philosophers—Nozick and Nussbaum—do not fare so well under
Harpham’s scrutiny. The chapters on Nozick and Nussbaum are not facile, po-
lemical dismissals, but careful, clinical, devastating analyses that offer a great
deal of irrefutable ‘‘is’’—in the form of extensive quotation—from the subjects
under demolition. Harpham begins his chapter on Nozick with an account of
Nozick’s complaint of a ‘‘slanderous distortion’’ of his work by Ian Hacking.
Nozick protests that he does not, as Hacking charges, describe rationality as a
‘‘hypostasised entity’’ but rather that by ‘‘rationality’’ he means the ‘‘continuing
rational actions of individuals’’ (101). In response, Harpham presents a pains-
taking reading of what he calls Nozick’s ‘‘confusions,’’ highlighted by Nozick-
isms like ‘‘Rationality has brought many benefits and thus enabled rationality
to extend its domain further’’ and ‘‘Rationality . . . is not the whole of our ratio-
nality’’ (106, 103). Harpham offers the neologism ‘‘rat’’ as a means of bracket-
ing the distinction between a hypostasised ‘‘rationalism’’ and rational people,
and then uses the term to effectively characterize Nozick’s ‘‘rationality’’ as a
‘‘self-glorifying, morally indifferent aggressivity’’ (110); that is, as something
ratlike.
While Nozick seems to be able to make the word ‘‘rationality’’ mean what-
ever he likes, so long as it signifies the seriousness of his own work, Martha
Nussbaum, as Harpham shows in one of the most dazzling performances in
Shadows, abuses the words ‘‘life’’ and ‘‘love’’ to similar effect in distinguishing
her own work from the supposed aridness of both analytic philosophy and
contemporary, materialist and poststructuralist, literary theory. The turns of
this essay are too complex to do justice to here, but Harpham’s carefully con-
structed but still stunning conclusion is that the hidden desire in Nussbaum’s
texts, which is to have a proximate but ‘‘pre-renounced’’ identification with
the love that undoes philosophy proper, can be found in Nussbaum’s ecstatic
identification with David Copperfield’s love for James Steerforth and in her
reading of the Phaedrus that sees only a ‘‘winged ascent ‘toward truth and
knowledge’ ’’ (236), with a seeming obliviousness to the fact that what she calls
love is in each text both homoerotic and pederastic. In Harpham’s reading,
Nussbaum’s ambivalence towards erotic love manifests itself in a repressed fas-
cination, on the part of the ‘‘feminine but not feminist’’ philosopher who pres-
ents perception as a good in itself, with a scene in which she could not
participate. Nussbaum is thus able to occupy ‘‘a morally optimal position
[that] is slightly, but not wholly removed from the tumultuous scene of action’’
(229).
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Harpham’s treatments of Jameson, Chomsky and Hartman are more sym-
pathetic. In Jameson’s case, Harpham finds a curious imbalance between
Jameson’s stature and his influence. As Harpham states, everyone recognizes
Jameson as America’s most important Marxist intellectual, but, he points out,
the major themes of Jameson’s hard Marxism—the necessity to destroy the
culture of individualism for the sake of a future collectivist utopia—have not
been the central concerns of the academic left during the period of Jameson’s
ascendancy. In Jameson’s later work, such as States of Theory, Harpham finds
a stylistic softening that accommodates the soft totality of global capitalism,
and makes Jameson now ‘‘our preeminent postmodern theorist’’ (179), writing
brilliantly about a world that is as far as one could get from the one he tried
to bring about. The essays on Chomsky and Hartman are equally thorough
and even more personal. In each case, Harpham connects boyhood experi-
ences—Chomsky’s first published article, a high school newspaper editorial
on the fall of the Spanish anarchist uprising in Barcelona in 1937, and Hart-
man’s escape from Germany to England at the age of nine—to their later polit-
ical commitments. In Chomsky’s case, his insistence that any institutional
circumscription of human creativity is an assault on the genetic code, which
is programmed to produce sentences we have never heard, is traced back to
his childhood in an antifascist household. For Hartman, his focus on Words-
worth’s sympathy for outsiders becomes symptomatic of his belief that ‘‘cul-
ture must hold a place open for those who are not altogether ‘inside’ it’’ (216).
In one of the curious elements of the book’s structure, Harpham’s own
argument for something beyond the ‘‘culture’’ that Hartman clings to despite
the inherent ‘‘danger of purity’’ of cultural formations is placed in the book’s
first chapter, which was written specifically for this volume. In this essay, Har-
pham argues for a distinction between ‘‘culture,’’ a mode of identification
based in place and the past, and ‘‘society,’’ a voluntaristic association formed
on the basis of shared values. There is a tenuous link between this distinction
and the argument of the book’s last chapter, in which Harpham criticizes the
stance of the perpetually oppositional intellectual and urges academics to be
willing to take on the responsibilities of power. While the culture vs. society
opposition is provocative, I found the book’s final chapter disappointing.
There is some amusement value in Harpham’s needling of the ‘‘narcissistic op-
positionality’’ of bourgeois professionals who imagine themselves standing in
solidarity with the wretched of the earth and being ‘‘a royal pain’’ to those in
power, but Harpham’s example of the case in which it becomes necessary to
do more than stand on the sidelines gives me pause. Responding to Christo-
pher Norris’s Uncritical Theory: Postmodernism, Intellectuals, and the Gulf War,
Harpham remarks on Norris’s silence ‘‘on the question of what—Kuwait hav-
ing been invaded—one ought to do’’ (256). The rhetorical gesture of starting
the clock at the moment that They did X to Us in order to confer ethical value
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on Our Side is common to every tit-for-tat conflict; Israel/Palestine, Northern
Ireland, and the former Yugoslavia are some of the most recent examples. In
this case, the use of the term ‘‘Kuwait’’ as though it signified a naturally integral
political entity is the sort of rhetorical abuse that Harpham is usually very deft
at exploding.
The final chapter aside, the most serious criticism of the book as a whole
may lie in what is not there. In his two books on ethics in contemporary the-
ory, Shadows of Ethics and Getting It Right (Chicago, 1992), Harpham has not,
for some reason, offered a sustained critique of either Levinas or Foucault, the
two thinkers who have had the greatest influence in bringing ethics into the
field of literary and cultural theory. There are scattered comments on Levinas,
including the observation in Getting It Right that Levinas’s repression of history
has produced ‘‘a sense of sterility, abstraction, reduction, and even self-absorp-
tion,’’ but nothing like the sort of analysis that Harpham offers of Nozick or
Nussbaum. While I have a good deal of sympathy with Harpham’s comments
on Levinas, Levinas’s stature, and particularly his importance to Derrida, a
figure Harpham holds in the highest regard, would call for a more thorough
critique. Foucault would seem to offer himself to Harpham as a Nussbaum-
like target, with his texts fissured between scholarly findings and powerful de-
sires, but Harpham’s critical view of ‘‘culture’’ as opposed to ‘‘society’’ would
demand a sustained engagement with the influence of Foucault in cultural
studies, a mode of study that Harpham’s view of ‘‘culture’’ would seem to sug-
gest is flawed from its origins. Perhaps it is the measure of this long and stimu-
lating book that my only serious criticism is that I would like to see more.
On the whole, Shadows of Ethics is a book whose value goes beyond the
particulars of its separate, often brilliant, analyses. For my money, Harpham
is our best contemporary theorist of ethics. His skeptical temper consistently
conveys the necessity of never overestimaging the depth of one’s own knowl-
edge. The overly confident are his natural prey. This epistemological asceti-
cism gives a sense of the moral weight of words; Harpham’s wit appears in
flashes, but the underlying power of his work depends upon putting his formi-
dable intellect in the service of discerning the connections between the most
sophisticated rhetorical practices and their most direct moral consequences.
I would also like to say a word about the production of this book by the
Duke University Press. This is a long book—I estimate over 120,000 words—
and it is crammed into 263 pages by the device of using very tiny print. Every-
one understands the present economic difficulties of academic publishing, but
reducing costs in this way will make this book physically difficult to read for
many people.
James O’Rourke
Florida State University
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The Romantic Performative: Language and Action in British and German Romanti-
cism by Angela Esterhammer. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000. Pp.
xv 357. $55.00 cloth.
Over the past few years, Romanticists have had to confront (or, perhaps,
accept as a fact) the apparent decline of their field, particularly its waning po-
tential for opening new and compelling perspectives on literary and cultural
studies overall. No doubt, some of the reasons for this widely deplored trend
are institutional and economic—mere epiphenomena of the pervasive trend of
‘‘downsizing’’ the humanities in favor of grant-getting and revenue-generating
work in the sciences and, on a smaller scale, the social sciences. The embattled
condition of Romanticists thus ought to be understood as but one symptom
of the pervasive transformation of the university over the past twenty years
or so, away from the intellectual and (admittedly Western-Europe dominated)
universitas envisioned by Humboldt, Hegel, Coleridge and their late-Romantic
contemporaries and toward a (still Anglo-European–dominated) model of the
university as one more corporate subject within a transnational and for-profit-
only global business culture. On that count, it would seem that things, not-
withstanding the standard line of university administrators about a rapidly
changing world, do indeed stay the same. For just as the liberal-secular institu-
tions of higher learning delivered the cultural justifications and technological
means required for the twin projects of nineteenth-century Nationalism and
Imperialism, so the early twenty-first century worship of ‘‘interdisciplinarity,’’
new media, and ‘‘excellence’’ (the ‘‘Test Act’’ for any successful career in uni-
versity administration today) essentially replicates the globalist credo in per-
petual technological innovation and the tearing down of obstacles to free trade
whereby transnational corporations and their umbrella organizations evange-
lize capital as intrinsically benevolent and profit-motives as the very fuel for
social progress.
In his new book, The Law of Cool, Alan Liu offers a poignant commentary
on the uncertain ‘‘future of literature and literary study when all culture is in-
creasingly the culture of information and when even literary scholars subordi-
nate literature to an apparent clone of information: cultural context?’’ Liu’s
view of literature’s vaunted autonomy as but a short-lived epoch within the far
more enduring and inventive quest of ‘‘the literary’’ to find new idioms and
roles in changing times is, if only implicitly, seconded by the architecture of
Angela Esterhammer’s study of the Romantic performative. Arguably the most
remarkable feature in a book of many strengths, it is the insistence of The Ro-
mantic Performative on taking us beyond Romanticism as endlessly ruminating
and eulogizing the death of Literature or, inversely, writing yet another critical
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and righteous expose´ of its figural contradictions or ideological complicity. In-
stead, Esterhammer reads Romanticism as a watershed moment in the under-
standing of language tout court, with Literature advancing this broader project
in important, though certainly no longer exclusive ways. By approaching Ro-
manticism’s ‘‘linguistic and poetic texts . . . [as] both analyses of language as
action and instances of language as action’’ (3), she credits the period with a
kind of reflexivity and fluidity that so often seems missing in eagerly political
or materialistic accounts of Romantic writing. Indeed, Esterhammer goes fur-
ther by contending that Romanticism’s ‘‘speaking subject tends to be a much
more fluid entity . . . than it is in twentieth-century speech-act theory—neither
a function of the power that linguistic rules and societal conventions assign to
certain utterances, nor an independent agent exerting control over the external
world, but a mind negotiating its position with respect to language, nature,
and society’’ (13).
The book’s seven main chapters take us from the debate over promises,
contracts and constitutions in Britain (Burke, Paine, Bentham) through a dis-
cussion of German Idealism (Kant and Fichte), German philosophy of lan-
guage (Bernhardi, Humboldt) to readings of individual authors (Coleridge,
Ho¨lderlin, Kleist, and Godwin). Throughout the book, Esterhammer’s com-
mand of her primary materials, as well as the range of her scholarship (both
philological and theoretical) proves truly remarkable and ensures that her
study, however wide-ranging and ambitious, remains at all times on firm
ground. In its scholarly and critical demeanor, The Romantic Performative
makes an eloquent plea not only for reintegrating the study of literature with
the larger theoretical and political effects of writing at a time when ‘‘literature’’
had barely begun to claim formal-aesthetic autonomy for itself, but also for the
seemingly defunct field of comparative literature and its lately ignored capacity
for productively integrating literature with theory.
Esterhammer’s first chapter focuses on the French Revolution and its
stunning impact on public print-culture in Britain. If time then seemed ripe to
acknowledge the instability and consequent malleability of political realities as
de facto linguistic fictions, Esterhammer shows how premonitions of this shift
can be found in Hume’s and Thomas Reid’s particularly intriguing exploration
of promises and other, non-propositional types of linguistic expression. The
differentia specifica in most discussions of the performative—the question of
intentionality—already emerges with great clarity in Reid’s distinction be-
tween ‘‘the will to engage’’ and the ‘‘will to perform what we have engaged’’
(39). Here ‘‘a revealing contrast between the British and German traditions
emerges. For the Germans (including Herder, Humboldt, and Bernhardi), lan-
guage is essentially dialogic because cognition is essentially dialogic. For Reid,
language is essentially dialogic—but precisely this distinguishes it from cogni-
tion and renders it essential to the existence of human beings as social crea-
tures.’’ It is here that Esterhammer locates the emergent distinction between
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performativity as ‘‘a phenomenological’’ or ‘‘sociopolitical’’ act (40), a distinc-
tion that was to ignite such heated debate between Searle and Derrida about
whether performative utterances are by their very nature undecidable and (as
a further consequence of Derrida’s argument, and one particularly unsettling
to Searle) impossible to distinguish from any other forms of utterance. Ever
vigilant of human beings’ proclivity to confuse linguistic and material realities,
Bentham here appears as a direct precursor to Derrida (and also Paul de Man)
when he asserts that ‘‘the various declarations issued by the French National
Assembly . . . [inasmuch as] they bring into being exactly the reality they de-
scribe’’ produce ‘‘absurdity or self-contradiction’’ (51). What Derrida was to
label the ‘‘fabulous retroactivity’’ of constitutionalist practice is here already
subjected to a critique that, interestingly, confounds the usual dichotomy be-
tween a politically conservative but rhetorically adventurous Burkean model
and the politically principled and hence conservative linguistic theories of the
Painites. This is outstanding, superbly informed expository writing on intri-
cate and often ignored theoretical questions, and Esterhammer pushes her
analyses to the point that ‘‘metaphysical questions about the power of lan-
guage’’ (66) also begin to open up. Among these figures centrally the tension
between Paine’s idea of an ‘‘original, transcendent contract’’ and his genera-
tion’s desire to define that contract anew, in spite of the apparent and seem-
ingly overwhelming power of historical time.
The next chapter explores a significant ‘‘structural parallel’’ (75) between
the Kantian transcendental apperception (the ‘‘I think’’ that must accompany
all representation) and Fichte’s foundational act (Tathandlung) of the self posit-
ing itself on the one hand, and the basic structure of performative utterances
on the other. Where Kant’s prose often proves reticent when it comes to ac-
knowledging its linguistic underpinnings, Esterhammer sensibly averts to
Herder’s largely unread Metakritik of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (78–83) as
arguably the first attempt to ‘‘link Kant’s First Critique with universal gram-
mar—the study of parts of speech in terms of universal logical categories,
rather than in relation to specific natural languages, that formed the prevailing
mode of linguistic scholarship during the eighteenth century’’ (81). Quite pos-
sibly, no theorist would seem more pertinent to a study of Romantic performa-
tivity than Fichte. In her reading of his Wissenschaftslehre (Science of
Knowledge), Esterhammer persuasively traces the degree to which Fichte’s
epigenetic account of the self (as Setzen) relates to the positional power of lan-
guage (Satz), and how Fichte ultimately ‘‘fails [‘‘avoids’’ might not have been
too strong a word] to work out the larger linguistic implications of his own
idealist philosophy’’ (88). In yet another of her numerous valuable recoveries
of overlooked and theoretically pioneering texts from the Romantic era, Ester-
hammer juxtaposes Fichte’s hesitant, even defensive relationship to the lin-
guistic foundations of his formalist logic with August Ferdinand Bernhardi
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(1769–1820). Bernhardi’s Sprachlehre (1801–1803), and even more so, Hum-
boldt’s numerous and more widely known writings on universal grammar and
its relationship to cognition, lead Esterhammer to these momentous conclu-
sions:
It is illustrative . . . that speech-act philosophers tend to observe the
asymmetry of first-person forms and modify their analysis accord-
ingly, without investigating the role of the I itself. The Romantic per-
formative, on the other hand, grows out of a theorization of the I in
its relation to being, objective reality, and other human subjects. It
therefore focuses on utterances that not only (like the modern per-
formative) alter the circumstances in which they are spoken, but also
react back on the speaker, altering the I itself and its relation to the
hearer and context.
(99–100)
Humboldt, above all, appears to have understood the extraordinary autonomy
of the linguistic medium vis-a`-vis the intentions that the speaking subject ap-
pears to project onto it. For Humboldt, the study of language essentially places
the enigmatic nature of Kant’s ‘‘synthesis’’ (nowhere more apparent than in the
chapter on the ‘‘Schematism’’ from the First Critique) on firm empirical
footing.
It is beyond the scope of this review to detail the wealth and acuity of
Esterhammer’s subsequent readings of Coleridge, Ho¨lderin, Kleist, and God-
win. Of these, Kleist may well prove the one most congenial and supportive
of Esterhammer’s overall reading of Romanticism as a variously explicit or im-
plicit meditation on the performative and world-constituting power of linguis-
tic fictions. Esterhammer’s wholly lucid account of Kleist’s most ambitious
novella, Michael Koohlhaas, ends with what Coleridge would surely have called
‘‘genial coincidence.’’ A quote from Jeremy Bentham’s 1791 critique of the
French National Assembly’s Declaration of Rights exemplifies his skepticism
with the very image of horses left to a stranger’s care and received back in
nearly worthless condition that was to become the thematic premise for Kle-
ist’s story. To exist in the world is, for Bentham and Kleist, no less than for
us, to take things on faith (or on promise) with no collateral to back us up:
‘‘[Bentham’s] evocative image suggests that not only Kohlhaas’s declarations,
but the fate of the horses that represent the catalyst for his whole adventure,
may be read as an illustration of how the meaning and effect of words shift
beyond the control of those who use them and those whose lives they alter’’
(279). Koohlhaas’s fantasy, which in the end may also be that of more ‘‘conser-
vative’’ twentieth-century theoreticians of the performative, appears to be that
language—particularly the black-on-white solidity of print culture—ought to
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be as permanent as the ‘‘blacks’’ (his horses) whom he expects in their ‘‘origi-
nal’’ condition. In one way or another, the oeuvre of each author focused on
by Esterhammer’s study revolves around this fantasy of ‘‘a language that . . .
neither deforms reality nor is deformed by it’’ (279).
One regret about this otherwise excellent study has to do with its overly
streamlined account of performativity. Given the complexity of twentieth-cen-
tury debate on this manner, it would have been useful to explore how the
‘‘greater fluidity and creativity’’ of the Romantic performative might compel a
reevaluation of its twentieth-century successors. Yet these figures (Austin,
Searle, Derrida, K. O. Apel and Habermas) are disposed of in less than ten
pages, and their function appears to be mostly to attest to the topical rele-
vance, not the conceptual tensions, of performative theories of language today.
Thus Esterhammer’s argument concerning Romanticism as precursor to late-
twentieth-century speech-act theories remains largely invariant throughout
the book, and all figures ultimately converge in the same notion of language
as bearing the imprint of a deep-structural, pragmatic motivation—the instan-
tiation of so many realities qua symbolic action. By and large, this formal
schema dominates over the consideration of the social and political effects pro-
duced by the very fact that the Romantics thought of themselves as inhabiting
language both as the domain of political and cultural practice and as the cata-
lyst for theorical awareness of that very condition. As her readings of Godwin,
Kleist, and Ho¨lderlin clearly imply—though Esterhammer does not always fol-
low up on that implication—to dwell within language as the domain of (vir-
tual) practices and to grasp it theoretically as the Reflexionsmedium (Benjamin’s
word) for performative self-constitution entails an attenuated, even skeptical
perspective on political action. While the careers of the four primary ‘‘literary’’
figures in Esterhammer’s study (Coleridge, Godwin, Ho¨lderlin, and Kleist)
would certainly support that contention, The Romantic Performative curiously
foregoes any consideration of the social and political effects wrought by the
acceptance of its very thesis. That the book at times foregoes drawing out the
implications of its central thesis seems particularly regrettable given that, as
Esterhammer herself shows so well, the Romantics appeared more willing to
countenance the implications and imponderables of performativity than many
of the theoreticians writing on the same subject in the second half of the twen-
tieth century.
Thomas Pfau
Duke University

British Romanticism and the Science of Mind by Alan Richardson. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xx 243. $55.00 cloth.
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By putting old doctrines in new ways, and using, in their exposition,
more recent terms, we may deceive ourselves into the belief that we
are saying something fundamentally original.
John Hughlings Jackson, Selected Writings
(New York: Basic Books, 1958), II, 7.
Richardson’s is a book of so many virtues that it is difficult to know what to
praise first. I would feel presumptuous in attempting to review it were it not
for the fact that I have myself twice made brief forays onto similar ground, and
can therefore judge, by the superiority of Richardson’s achievements to my
own earlier efforts, how much this author has accomplished. (See my ‘‘Contri-
bution of Neurology to the Scepticism of Alfred de Vigny,’’ Journal of the His-
tory of Medicine and Allied Sciences IX [July, 1954], 329–48, as well as The
Uncreating Word: Romanticism and the Object [Bloomington and London: Indi-
ana University Press, 1970], pp. 14–19). One also recognizes the scope and
vigor of the work when one sets it beside another on a related topic, Under-
taker of the Mind: John Monro and Mad-Doctoring in Eighteenth-Century England,
by Jonathan Andrews and Andrew Scull (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: Uni-
versity of California Press, 2001). By comparison, the latter seems almost de-
void of informing concepts, and lacking in any theoretical framework. Jane
Wood’s Passion and Pathology in Victorian Fiction (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2001), is in some respects a complementary work to Richardson’s: it
attempts a survey something like Richardson’s for the later nineteenth century,
but it is largely concerned with gender issues, and it pays less attention to the
philosophical principles underlying the medical issues than does Richardson.
For the amateur in psychoneurology, perhaps the most striking feature of the
book is the easy familiarity that it demonstrates with the work of major au-
thors in modern neuroscience and cognitive linguistics: Hobson, Damasio,
Flanagan, Lakoff, Pinker, Varela, among many others in a list that stretches
back to Donald Hebb and beyond. Such knowledge lifts the work out of the
parochial realm of period studies into that wider historical arena in which re-
current intellectual themes are seen in action, as they revise their antecedents
and prepare the way for their successors.
British Romanticism and the Science of Mind is crammed with interesting
background information, much of it not usually noticed by the student of liter-
ary romanticism. A profusion of odd and unusual, one might almost say deli-
cious, details make the book fun to read, despite its density of reference:
Erasmus Darwin traces the smile to the relaxation of the infant’s mouth after
nursing (153); Coleridge speaks of a ‘‘sort of stomach sensation attached to
all my thoughts’’ (62); Charles Bell finds in the ‘‘expressions, attitudes, and
movements of the human figure’’ a universal ‘‘grammar’’ for the fine arts (77);
La Mettrie wonders how intellectual excitement was transformed into a physi-
cal ‘‘fever’’ (128); Franz Joseph Gall is excommunicated (69). There is a long
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and interesting section on the powers of extra-linguistic reasoning evinced by
someone born deaf and blind (James Mitchell; 154–58), a detailed account of
Keats’s exposure, as a medical student, to the most advanced neuroscience of
his day (114–24), and the hilarious tale of (later ‘‘Sir’’) Humphry Davy’s exper-
iments with the mind-altering effects of nitrous oxide, in which he had one
subject capering about the room, Mrs. Beddoes levitating, and Coleridge beat-
ing the ground with his feet (51–52). There is also a series of striking anatomi-
cal plates from the neurological works of the day interspersed throughout the
text. Those who may be inclined to dismiss these illustrations of the brain,
with their numbered areas, as obsolete curiosities, should notice that they bear
a strong family resemblance to the brain map of Korbinian Brodmann (1868–
1918), also with its numbered areas, which remains an indispensable tool of
neuroscience to this day. Cerebral localization, always in dispute, is still an
essential instrument of functional neuroanatomy, and the latest online Talair-
ach brain atlas still draws on the discoveries of early nineteenth-century sci-
ence.
If one could isolate one argument from this rich and complex book, it
might be that, during the later eighteenth century, psychology moved from a
Cartesian mind-body dualism on the one hand, and Lockean tabula rasa prin-
ciples on the other, through what might be called a mechanistic phase among
some of the French ide´ologues, to arrive at what Richardson regards as a typi-
cally Romantic—and modern—view of the mind. This view, Richardson pro-
poses, unites mind and body, operating as a single activity entity, in which
affect and thought are one in their encounter with experience, so that, in a
Wordsworthian phrase, we ‘‘half create’’ what we perceive, or, better still, in
Shelley’s terms, learn to imagine what we know. Angelika Rauch, in The Hiero-
glyph of Tradition: Freud, Benjamin, Gadamer, Novalis, Kant (Madison, Teaneck:
Fairleigh Dickinson University Press; London: Associated University Presses,
2000) raises similar issues: for her, too, the mark of the post-Kantian is the
mind-body fusion, and the key question is ‘‘what kind of relationship exists
between sensuality and mental representation, and what role does imagination
play in it?’’ (81). For Richardson, the mind, with all its instincts and faculties
(or, if one prefers, ‘‘modules’’), is anything but passive: it encounters the vari-
ety of experience already primed to deal with it in appropriate ways, organiz-
ing it, emotionally, perceptually, and linguistically to the greatest advantage of
the organism. Much of this activity is unconscious, and Richardson relates the
emphasis on the unconscious during this period to the emphasis on the physi-
cal aspects of the mind.
Richardson builds upon an enormous amount of careful reading in both
primary and secondary sources. If there be any one area in which one could
say that the greatest contribution of this book is made, it is probably in the
author’s exhaustive treatment of material commonly alluded to but rarely read
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thoroughly. Herder, Erasmus Darwin, Gall and Spu¨rzheim, Charles Bell, Wil-
liam Lawrence, not to mention Hartley and Priestley, receive the kind of sus-
tained attention that brings out their unmistakable relevance to the work of
Coleridge, Wordsworth, Keats, and Jane Austen. Richardson deals in telling
detail with such obvious targets as Keats’s ‘‘Ode to Psyche,’’ but along the way
he also makes frequent excursions into areas that we would not initially associ-
ate with his subject, but that he illuminates brilliantly by demonstrating their
connection to neurological thinking. For instance, on the one hand, he will
explore the very specific topic of the feral child (159); on the other, he will not
hesitate to investigate the broad and important distinction between abstract
and corporeal universalism (152–53), in which what unites humanity is un-
derstood to be, alternatively, the identity of human minds or the universal fact
of their embodiment.
It is difficult to find anything to object to in this exemplary work: at most,
one might say that it sometimes feels as if it proves too much. Historiography
is, after all, at least partly a matter of taste, and one might be relieved to have
an occasional acknowledgment that different styles of history might have em-
phasized different aspects of the same material. There is also occasionally the
sense that we are being overwhelmed with information, or being obliged to
deal with an embarrassment of riches. As a gloss on the stanza from Words-
worth’s ‘‘Expostulation and Reply,’’ ‘‘The eye it cannot choose but see, / We
cannot bid the ear be still,’’ the author offers ‘‘Wordsworth found in Zoonomia
a theory of active perception and a conception of ideas grounded in charged
physical sensations’’ (72). We emerge with the rather un-Wordsworthian im-
pression that there are in fact no sermons in stones (or in the body); that every
idea is a repetition of somebody else’s recently published idea; that there is no
such thing as an innocent or an independent statement; that no utterance is
comprehensible without a footnote. It seems much easier to accept Richard-
son’s common-sense remark that Wordsworth’s poetry shows strong affinities
with the physiological psychology of the time simply because of ‘‘a network of
shared pretexts, ideals, and aims’’ (70).
Again, someone with nominalist predilections (such as myself ) might not
be entirely at ease with the unswerving defense of Romanticism as a hyposta-
tized entity (e.g., 198), and with the general tendency to define, categorize,
and identify movements, or to claim pristine novelty for schools of thought.
After all, the science of rhetoric would never have been invented if people had
not realized, long before the late eighteenth-century physiological psycholo-
gists, that the emotions influence the reasoning process. Richardson writes
with a confidence well justified by his knowledge, but, in the humanities,
areas of uncertainty will always persist, simply because of the room for inter-
pretation. It is consequently a relief to find that Richardson is prepared to
admit, at least once in a while, that there are ambiguities in the evidence that
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supports his generalizations (86, 96, 174, 176–77, 179). The results might
also have been tilted in a slightly different direction if Richardson had included
references to a number of authors whose absence is puzzling in such a thor-
oughly researched book: Montaigne on ‘‘Cannibals,’’ Cudworth and Leibniz on
the unconscious, Shaftesbury as precursor of Wordsworth, Vico on the history
of language.
To raise the question of alternative interpretations on a larger scale: I am
not quite sure that modularism (whether Bell’s or Fodor’s—and modularism
is a theory that is, by the way, still very much in dispute—) really does rescue
us from mechanism, as Richardson apparently believes it does. Does endowing
the mind with adaptive predispositions, whether perceptual or linguistic, actu-
ally solve the problem of free will, or does it just move it back one space, sub-
stituting a lot of little machines for one big one? Writing late in the nineteenth
century, the eminent psychologist Alfred Maury would still speak of us as
nothing but the ‘‘tristes jouets du conflit des choses’’ (‘‘unhappy playthings of
conflicting forces’’), in Le Sommeil et les reˆves.
There is also another strain in the history of ideas associated with the sci-
ence of the mind, this time a tendency neither mechanistic nor organic, that
one might choose to notice. The awareness that the mind is active may lead
gradually back, once more, to the disquieting thought that the activity of the
mind is all that we can know. Physiological psychologists, who are constantly
confronted with the evidence for the endogenous nature of perception (see,
e.g., Richardson, 12, 32) may turn in an entirely different direction from the
one indicated by Richardson. One common outcome is an inclination towards
Eastern religions (Harry T. Hunt, Francisco Varela). Another is a principled
solipsism. This is a tendency that we find in the tradition leading out of the
‘‘no percept without a concept’’ assumptions of Kant into the philosopher
Fichte, the great neurologist Hughlings Jackson, on to Jackson’s later disciple,
the aphasiologist Jason W. Brown. A strong awareness of the fact that the ‘‘na-
ture’’ we construct is an uncertain thing may lead to a kind of intellectual resig-
nation, or even to a variety of stoic despair.
In any case, whatever differences of perspective on this interesting body
of material one may select to emphasize, it is a pleasure to argue with this
book, for which I have the highest admiration and the greatest respect.
Irving Massey
State University of New York, Buffalo

Wordsworth’s Profession: Form, Class, and the Logic of Early Romantic Cultural
Production by Thomas Pfau. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997. Pp. x
 454. $51.00 cloth.
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If art is a forgetting of that which it encrypts, can there be room for com-
prehending an affective ground of aesthetic experience? Romantic scholarship
has been preoccupied with questions of historical contingency for quite some
time. What often seems to be lacking is precisely what Thomas Pfau addresses:
the affective depth of the aesthetic precisely within the larger, anonymous his-
torical patterns it partly constructs. The circularity of such a paradigm can be
dizzying, and Pfau’s ability in this study to maintain his ground is nothing
short of spectacular.
Wordsworth’s Profession argues that England’s middling classes between
1740 and 1820 undergo a dramatic shift in self-understanding. Wishing to
distance themselves from the crass consumptive materialism of the upper
classes, but lacking a definable alternative in the arena of public accountability,
they reconfigure value in the terms of a productive subjectivity. In this under-
standing, the aesthetic must be productive before it is consumptive, with pro-
ductive subjectivity standing as the cherished result; the middle class thus
moves towards moral and cultural prominence even as it struggles with the
political and spiritual disenfranchisement that is its persistent inheritance. In
fact, Pfau argues, it is this very disjunction between political disenfranchise-
ment and cultural ascendancy that defines the period’s operational structures:
To the extent that it continually stimulates ‘mind’ to further, more
ambitious displays of imaginative mobility, Wordsworth’s poetry in
particular may be viewed as an encryption of its demographic uncon-
scious: the cultural Romance of the middle-class psyche as the story
of an unlimited development realized (and objectified for us) in
Wordsworth’s approach to discrete aesthetic forms and genres and
succinctly captured in his phrase of ‘‘something evermore about to
be.’’ (8)
The reciprocal legitimation between audience and author thus becomes
an important focal point, but it is one that opens onto so many avenues of
historical and cultural investigation that no brief description can do justice to
its breadth. Pfau is emphatically not interested in reducing the aesthetic to the
demographic, or in arguing for a simple causal narrative that collapses socio-
cultural history into its symbolic representations. Instead, he sees the emerg-
ing self-awareness of the middle class as the effect of Romantic cultural
productivity, and he understands that ‘‘only at a concrete rhetorical (and usu-
ally textual) level can we expect to gain insight into the aesthetic (and espe-
cially the ‘literary’) simulation of history as the understated (always ‘subtle’)
drama of its subjects’ psychological mobility’’ (3). This is a study of form and
genre that, following Clifford Siskin, views genre as constructing history
(rather than the other way around). Thus, history becomes a forum for com-
peting forms of desires and aspirations, where the cultural specificity of any
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particularized idiom is not presumed to invalidate the affective yield of such
forms. Rather, the very fundaments of affective experience become part of the
structure of feeling; cause and effect perform a dance here in which neither
quite leads nor quite follows.
The book is divided into three sections. The first traces the history of the
Picturesque in relation to the so-called ‘‘professionalization of leisure,’’ a proc-
ess by which its practitioners legitimate themselves as members of an estab-
lished, respected, and above all spiritually and culturally significant
community. In recognizing the Picturesque as a historically determined cul-
tural emergence, Pfau interrogates its theoretical claims about its own aesthetic
autonomy. The result is a reading of the Picturesque that situates it diacriti-
cally, and so finds ‘‘its aggressive aestheticization of political consciousness’’
(31). Where Wordsworth aestheticizes the landscape, then, his investment in
the strategies of the Picturesque enables a subtle self-reflexivity with respect to
the empirical actuality that his poetry only partly displaces. Descriptive detail
in much of the poetry stands as synecdoche for the reality of suffering the poet
beholds. Pfau also interrogates the critical, contemporary response to Words-
worth’s picturesque technique, and does some hard worrying over the charge
of near-criminal indifference to human suffering to which such descriptive ex-
ploitation has given rise. The processes of critical judgment, Pfau discovers,
are no less subject to historical determinations and unself-conscious motiva-
tions than the cultural practices they would indict.
The second section of the book ‘‘explores how the languages of pedagogi-
cal theory, didactic fiction, and the Wordsworthian ballad seek to inculcate
elemental, moral, and aesthetic literacy in their respective constituencies by
relying on a deep-structural logic or self-surveillance’’ (11). As such, the her-
meneutics implied by poetic diction fundamentally produces Romantic ‘‘sensi-
bility’’ until the ballad becomes the sign of the superior responsiveness of its
readers. Such reflexivity becomes the special sociocultural capital of the mid-
dle class, as insight and interpretive savvy comes to stand for productive work
within a new social consciousness. The economy of reciprocal affirmation,
however, is only the obverse of the productive power of tacit control; here
such controlling mechanisms are sublimated within the realm of aesthetic
judgment. Surveillance and good taste are inseparable twins.
The third and final section focuses on The Prelude. Pfau is at his most im-
pressive in this part, as he discusses the delicate process whereby Wordsworth
converts self-interest into a narrative idiom that is offered as the exemplar of
the poet’s social role. Wordsworth’s epic is founded partly on the poet’s strug-
gle to negotiate a ground between assertion of a unique interiority and the for-
mal structure he inherits to represent that uniqueness. Indeed, a real anxiety
can be found at the heart of Wordsworth’s investments in his own authenticity,
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and Pfau argues that ‘‘the structural antagonism between the autobiography’s
aesthetic and thematic levels essentially reproduces the political and economic
anxieties and contradictions against which Wordsworth works to establish his
vocational ethos and poetic beliefs, a dilemma structurally reflected in the
poem’s virtually unending history of textual revision’’ (13). Under this rubric,
Wordsworth’s epic stages a dynamic tension between the idea of a national
culture and the language of self-interest. The Prelude’s blank verse creates the
illusion of an immersion in the dross of the political interests of the moment
even as it protects its domain of cherished interiority. But that very autobio-
graphical narrative itself is to be read as the ‘‘work’’ of civic duty, insofar as the
entire enterprise is a prolonged promise of public accomplishment yet to come.
This is a dense and hard book, one whose conceptual synthesizing holds
several aesthetic, historical and cultural claims in balance at once. It is not sur-
prising, then, that Pfau’s prose sometimes tends towards the tortuous. But this
is a small complaint about a remarkable scholarly achievement. Wordsworth’s
Profession shows us not just how we come to constitute our love of cultural
products, but how we come to need that which we love. In this, it is a study
of the obtrusively human even as it scrutinizes the labyrinth of the impersonal
to which we are bound.
Karen A. Weisman
University of Toronto

The Challenge of Coleridge: Ethics and Interpretation in Romanticism and Modern
Philosophy by David P. Haney. University Park: Pennsylvania State University
Press, 2001. Pp. 328. $55.00 cloth.
Here’s a book that took me back to my first year in graduate school. It
was the early eighties, and I was waiting out the Reagan years in an English
department not renowned for its progressive politics but pretty highly ranked
nonetheless. I took a course in what was then called ‘‘literary theory,’’ having
no idea what to expect, but willing to learn. It was a challenge. We read philos-
ophy, a serious subject that, by its own testimony and that of our professor,
could explain things literature only dreamed of. There was Aristotle, and there
was Hegel, and there was Saussure, and there was Le´vi-Strauss, who was not
really a philosopher but treated whole cultures as if they were concepts. And
near the end of it all, with inscrutable pomp, loomed Heidegger, the most
challenging and most serious of them all. I couldn’t understand a word. I was
out of my depth. I was from the midwest, where to be philosophical means
.......................... 9672$$ $CH4 09-06-02 14:28:31 PS
84 Criticism, Vol. 44, No. 1: Book Reviews
quietly to accept your misfortune. But lucky for me and my benighted peers
our professor threw us a line to hang onto, something we could understand,
or at least try to, before going under for the last time: ‘‘the hermeneutic circle.’’
Thank God for the hermeneutic circle. It saved my career from foundering. It
made literary theory suddenly intelligible and literature pertinent to the task
of living.
Someone threw David P. Haney the same line, and he seems to have hung
on to it with the same sense of saving grace. For the hermeneutic circle pro-
vides him a way of making the relationship between a reader and a text ethical.
Drawing upon a distinguished if preferential array of recent writers on ethics
(Gadamer, Levinas, Ricoeur, Vattima, Nussbaum, Williams), Haney wants to
revive the hermeneutic tradition for contemporary literary interpretation. His
gambit is simple: that hermeneutics connects interpretation to ethics. Cole-
ridge is his test case not merely because Haney has a specialist’s knowledge of
British Romanticism, but more importantly because Coleridge was himself a
master of the tradition of German Biblical interpretation that gives rise to mod-
ern hermeneutics. As Haney puts it, ‘‘eighteenth-century hermeneutics played
an important role in the thought of Romantics such as Coleridge, influenced
later nineteenth-century theories of history, was existentialized by Heidegger,
and emerged in Gadamer, Ricoeur, and others as an important alternative to
the methods of the natural sciences’’ (22). The Challenge of Coleridge both situ-
ates Coleridge in this tradition and records the ‘‘conversations’’ that ensue
when contemporary practitioners of hermeneutics turn to face the challenge
of one of their most powerful progenitors.
And that is where the hermeneutic circle turns ethical: in the encounter
between past and present, or between contemporary reader and historical text.
Haney relies upon two features of the hermeneutic circle to connect ethics to
interpretation. First, it enforces in the interpreter a peculiar openness to a
knowledge that exceeds her. She cannot know the whole of the text’s meaning
except by way of parts that communicate it, yet she cannot know what those
parts communicate except by reference to the whole. The interpreter reads be-
tween the lines of total and partial knowledge, ever open to deeper under-
standing as it unfurls between them. Second, the hermeneutic circle conjures
in the interpreter a keen awareness of her historicity. She cannot approach a
text except by means of the interpretations it has produced. The interpreter
reads through a history that makes her response possible, for as Haney insists,
‘‘our interpretations are always implicated in the interpretive history of which
we are a part’’ (22). That is why Haney can describe, in good Gadamerian fash-
ion, the encounter between reader and text in unabashedly human terms. That
encounter ‘‘can be modeled on a conversation with another person’’ (47) be-
cause the knowledge that emerges both exceeds and unites both parties. Books
are people too, or at least enough like people to converse with. What makes
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this relationship ethical is its structural similarity to human communication.
As Haney describes it, waxing Heideggerian, ‘‘the process by which the ‘truth’
of a poem is revealed is instructively similar to the ‘unconcealing’ that goes on
in the ethical hermeneutics of being open to (instead of imposing, inserting,
or conceptualizing) the truth of another person’’ (46). The hermeneutic rela-
tionship between reader and text is thus an ethical relationship between self
and other, making interpretation an ethical activity huge with implications for
human life.
It would be beside the point to question the ebullient humanism of Ha-
ney’s ethics. That is precisely what he is arguing for, against the more debasing
effects of cultural and historical critique. For as he sees it, ‘‘the essential human
characteristic . . . for the post-Romantic tradition . . . is a life of language and
interpretation’’ (40). Homo Hermeneuticus: Haney understands the human as
the intepreting animal. His own interpretations of Coleridge nicely illustrate
this view. They take two forms, or rather comprise conversations of two kinds:
those between Coleridge and his interpretive descendents, and those between
Coleridge and Haney himself. The former intelligently adjudicate the claims,
then and now, of hermeneutics as an ethical enterprise. And they address some
pretty interesting issues. For instance, far from positing an autonomous con-
sciousness to account for human agency, Coleridge sees subjectivity as thor-
oughly social, conscience or consideration for others providing its true
ground. Or this: the copresence in Coleridge’s ethical thought of two kinds
of otherness, one reminiscent of the kind of dialectical selfhood that Ricoeur
theorizes, the other closer to Levinas’s more radical sense of an infinite Other
incommensurable with a finite self. Such careful and nuanced discussions of
Coleridge’s beliefs are typical of Haney’s labors and significantly complicate
our understanding of the sage of Highgate’s sense of ethics. Similarly illumi-
nating are Haney’s own conversations with Coleridge’s poetry. Seemingly ob-
sessed with the infamous Rime of the Ancient Mariner, Haney again and again
returns to its account of an apparently disturbed and disturbing old man’s com-
pulsive account of his harrowing adventure at sea. The apparent reason for this
preoccupation is the absolute Otherness of the Mariner, his irreducibility to
some finite sense of self: ‘‘he gives the Wedding Guest an experience of being
confronted by the absolutely other in human form’’ (220). What occurs in
Coleridge’s poem, as Haney reads it, is the production of ethical responsibility
in the witness—the reader as much as the Wedding Guest—of this Otherness.
That might explain why the Mariner so haunts Haney’s conversations.
Like some psychic trauma or physical wound, he provides a pained reminder
that absolute Otherness is beyond knowing. But this is where, to my mind at
least, the hermeneutic circle snaps and becomes just another of philosophy’s
old lines. For it manifestly fails in the face of the other. The conversations of
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hermeneutics cannot fathom an Other whose difference is absolute. The Mari-
ner himself is a pretty poor conversationalist. He all but silences his chance
companion and leaves him stunned to depart for home alone. As absolute
Other, the Mariner puts an end to conversation. He haunts hermeneutics as he
haunts Haney’s discussion, an emissary from the world outside the magic cir-
cle of conversation. The historical assumption of hermeneutics, that ‘‘our in-
terpretations are always implicated in the interpretive history of which we are
a part,’’ renders its ethical possibilities at best convenient, at worst presumptu-
ous. For under such circumstances the other becomes, as Coleridge is to Ga-
damer, an earlier version of the interpreter, not radically different, just less
contemporary. No wonder the Mariner won’t go away. He comes to remind
Haney that true Otherness exceeds the capacity of hermeneutics to engage let
alone explain.
That is also the lesson of Haney’s attempt to demonstrate the contempo-
rary relevance of hermeneutics. In a laudable effort to assess the alleged ‘‘copy-
cat’’ killing that followed the release of Oliver Stone’s film Natural Born Killers,
Haney claims that ‘‘copy-cat violence may have less to do with the movies than
with our modes of interpretation’’ (160), concluding that ‘‘if Natural Born Kill-
ers has ‘caused’ violence, it is at least partly because we have refused to teach
or engage modes of interpretation in which an ethically active engagement of
imagination allows works of art to challenge the spectator from a position of
otherness’’ (162). Maybe so, but what troubles me about this diagnosis is its
complacency toward the social conditions and cultural incentives that interact
to motivate violence of the sort that erupted at Columbine, Haney’s prime ex-
ample of copy-cat killing. If the best that hermeneutics can do is hold out the
hope of private edification (that ‘‘ethically active enagement of imagination’’)
as a deterrent to social problems, I think we best put Gadamer back on the
shelf. What if ethical responsibility involves not conversation but struggle?
What if social justice requires not literary interpretation but political engage-
ment? The Challenge of Coleridge, for all its interest in ethics, allows its commit-
ment to hermeneutic to eclipse all regard for the social circumstances wherein
alone ethical awareness might make a difference rather than just confront one.
Paul Youngquist
Penn State University

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In Lord Byron at Harrow School, Paul Elledge focuses on Byron’s checkered
career at Harrow (1801–1805) and his three Speech Day performances there:
as King Latinus in Virgil’s Aeneid, the villainous Zanga in Edward Young’s The
Revenge, and King Lear raging against the storm. Byron entered Harrow at the
age of thirteen, fatherless, hypersensitive about his lame foot, ill-prepared aca-
demically, spoiled by maternal indulgence, with few social connections, and
poorer than many of his schoolmates. One of his instructors complained bit-
terly about the young lord’s ‘‘Inattention to Business, and his propensity to
make others laugh and disregard their Employments as much as himself’’ (18).
During his years at public school, Byron had to contend with antagonistic tu-
tors, the taunts of his fellow pupils (he later claimed that he won all but one
of his eight fist fights), torrents of verbal abuse from his mother, and (possibly)
sexual advances from his tenant at Newstead Abbey, Lord Henry Grey de
Ruthyn. But in spite of his traumatic experiences, he eventually rose to promi-
nence at Harrow, becoming the leader of the student opposition to the new
headmaster and distinguishing himself in three dramatic recitations. His
Speech Day declamations, which took place on 5 July 1804, 6 June 1805, and
4 July 1805, played an important role in his self-fashioning. As Byron indicates
in entry 34 of his Detached Thoughts (written 1821–1822), his ‘‘temper and
disposition’’ changed radically during his last year at Harrow.
Elledge suggests in an endnote that his book is a prequel to Jerome Chris-
tensen’s Lord Byron’s Strength: Romantic Writing and Commercial Society (1993).
Whereas Christensen’s account of the poet’s identity formation commences
with the publication of Hours of Idleness (1807), Elledge maintains that Byron’s
self-invention began several years earlier. His analysis of Byron’s Harrow career
is informed by recent studies of Romantic theatricality by Judith Pascoe and
others. Growing up in a stagestruck culture, the young lord self-consciously
developed and refined his theatrical skills, writing dramatic letters to his
mother and half-sister, posing moodily in the Harrow churchyard, attending
several performances of the thirteen-year-old acting sensation William Henry
West Betty (‘‘Master Betty’’), and delivering dramatic recitations on Speech
Day. These declamations become for Elledge ‘‘auditions, [the] inaugural per-
formances of ‘Byron’—in the provincial run, so to speak, before his London
premiere’’ (1).
A partial biography like Lord Byron at Harrow School has an important ad-
vantage over a full-length biography: its limited scope enables it to examine a
part of the subject’s life in great detail. Thus Elledge is able to provide us with
an exceptionally thorough analysis of Byron’s sudden and unexplained break
with Lord Grey. A birth-to-death biography is, however, better designed than a
narrowly focused one to make generalizations about its subject and to identify
patterns in an individual’s life. Elledge suggests that we can detect ‘‘the seed
and shape of the 1820 [1824?] defender of Greece’’ in the young lord guarding
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Harrow ‘‘against the invasion from Cambridge [by the new Headmaster Dr.
George Butler]’’ (100), but due to the limitations of his study he cannot de-
velop this point. Moreover, he cannot consider the influence of the poet’s early
theatrical performances on his dramas.
Although Elledge asserts that ‘‘Whether Byron’s harsh treatment of many
women reflects his own misuse by Grey and others, the psychiatrists must de-
termine’’ (177n.26), his account of the poet’s adolescence is clearly ‘‘psycho-
biographical’’ (14). His approach eschews, however, ‘‘the emphasis on infantile
experience in Freudian psychology and paradigms derived from it’’ (3), which
would suggest that Byron’s personality was already formed by the time he en-
tered Harrow School. According to Elledge, ‘‘conventionally, adolescence pro-
vides a second chance, an opportunity for dissolving or at any rate loosening
the fixations in which the child is trapped by dependence upon its parents’’
(3). His ‘‘unapologetically inferential criticism’’ (15) uses relevant texts, such
as Byron’s letters, poems, and speeches, to uncover the ways in which the
young man created ‘‘his own separate self’’ (2) through performing and testing
numerous roles.
Elledge argues that Byron’s quarrels with his first tutor at Harrow, Henry
Drury (the Headmaster’s son), and his sudden and unexplained alienation
from Lord Grey, his tenant at Newstead Abbey, profoundly influenced his
emerging sense of himself. Bored by the grind of daily lessons, Byron neglected
his studies and distracted his classmates, and he and Drury frequently clashed.
The Headmaster, Dr. Joseph Drury, transferred the young troublemaker to an-
other tutor, but a few months later Drury enraged his former pupil by saying
behind his back that he was a ‘‘blackguard’’ (19). Although Byron had culti-
vated a reputation as a fighter and scapegrace at Harrow, he could not allow
his former tutor, a mere commoner, to define him. He wrote a histrionic letter
to his mother defending himself from the charge of blackguardism and asking
her to intercede on his behalf with the Headmaster, whom he apparently re-
garded as a surrogate father. This quarrel was smoothed over by Dr. Drury, but
a year later the Headmaster’s brother Mark Drury also called Byron a black-
guard, prompting another emotional outburst from the insecure boy. Elledge
emphasizes Byron’s sensitivity to the power of speech (particularly abusive
speech) to ‘‘represent and affect reality, transmit messages, assault, and
injure’’ (20).
Byron and the Drurys resolved their differences, but Byron came to regard
Lord Grey as his ‘‘most inveterate enemy’’ (50). Soon after Grey took up resi-
dence at Newstead Abbey in November 1803 he invited Byron to stay with
him, and at first they enjoyed each other’s company. Grey loved to hunt, and
the two aristocrats frequently went out during moonlit nights to shoot pheas-
ants. However, between 28 December 1803 and 22 January 1804 (Byron’s six-
teenth birthday) the older man apparently did or said something that
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estranged and traumatized his young landlord. According to Leslie A. March-
and and Doris Langley Moore, Grey disgusted Byron by making unwelcome
sexual overtures; Elledge believes that the situation was more complicated. He
contends that Byron was at least initially receptive to his tenant’s advances and
that his subsequent hysteria resulted from Grey’s ‘‘infidelity, or flightiness, or
silliness, or affectational superficiality’’ (33), the boy’s suspicion ‘‘of aberration
in himself’’ (37), and his awareness of the severe punishments meted out to
those who engaged in homosexual acts during the Georgian period. Byron’s
alienation from Grey haunts his correspondence with his half-sister Augusta
and may have become ‘‘the foundation and rationale for [his] later insistence
on the purity of his passion for John Edleston’’ (38). Much to the boy’s disgust,
Mrs. Byron flirted with Grey and vainly insisted that her son reconcile with
him. Somewhat implausibly, Elledge speculates that Byron feared his mother
would ‘‘capture Grey in a relationship.’’ Mrs. Byron, whom her son contemp-
tuously dubbed ‘‘the dowager,’’ was about fifteen years older than the twenty-
three-year-old Grey, corpulent, and impoverished. It seems unlikely that
Byron could have seriously believed that his mother’s embarrassing flirtation
with the young aristocrat would result in an ‘‘intimate association’’ (75).
While Byron honed his performative skills at Harrow, the thirteen-year-
old acting prodigy ‘‘Master Betty’’ (also known as the ‘‘Young Roscius’’) was
thrilling audiences throughout England with his renditions of dramatic roles
ranging from Norval in John Home’s Douglas to Frederick in Elizabeth Inch-
bald’s Lovers’ Vows. In a 25 April 1805 letter Byron reported to Augusta that
he had seen ‘‘the young Roscius several times at the hazard of [his] life, from
the affectionate squeezes of the surrounding crowd’’ (106). Although in the
same letter Byron seems far from impressed by Master Betty’s performances,
Elledge conjectures that he both envied and identified with the ‘‘Infant Phe-
nomenon.’’ According to Elledge, portraits of the thirteen-year-old actor re-
semble a pencil sketch of Byron at the same age, and Master Betty’s ability to
transcend the ‘‘handicap’’ of his short stature (as a boy playing adult roles)
would have been inspirational to a sixteen-year-old who hoped to achieve
public success and popularity in spite of his lameness. Elledge’s discussion of
the Young Roscius’s possible influence on Byron is intriguing but based en-
tirely on inference: Byron’s assessments of Master Betty’s acting abilities were
fairly dismissive, and we cannot be sure which of the boy actor’s performances
he witnessed.
The roles that Byron performed during Speech Day were, Elledge con-
tends, carefully chosen. Originally, Byron planned to take on the role of
Drances in a colloquy from the Aeneid but chose the part of King Latinus in-
stead, possibly because Turnus’s allusion to Drances’s ‘‘flying feet’’ might have
called attention to his lameness. Having been labeled a blackguard by Henry
and Mark Drury, he decided to play the role of the villain Zanga, a Moor, to
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impersonate and exorcise the hurtful epithet. His final performance as King
Lear was also cathartic, offering him ‘‘a ritual of passage whereby he . . .
claim[ed] a robust manhood that ha[d] been in part forged by his vanquish-
ment of perceived injustices at Harrow’’ (159). In Lord Byron at Harrow School,
Elledge persuasively argues that Byron’s transformation into a great poet, ce-
lebrity, and legend began at public school, in an ‘‘environment that variously
allow[ed] and opportunistically encourage[d] Byron to become ‘Byron’ ’’ (4).
Perhaps this fascinating book will inspire a scholar to undertake a detailed ex-
amination of Percy Bysshe Shelley’s tumultuous and histrionic career at Eton,
which ended with Shelley’s recitation, during the leaving ceremony, of one of
Cicero’s orations against Catiline.
William D. Brewer
Appalachian State University

Nationalists and Nomads by Christopher L. Miller. Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 1998. Pp. 258. $46.00 cloth, $19.00 paper.
The collection of six essays which constitute this study takes its title from
what Christopher L. Miller describes as a troubling ‘‘conundrum in some con-
temporary criticism.’’ In his introduction, ‘‘History and Hybridity,’’ he de-
scribes the conundrum thus: ‘‘the world is divided between, on the one hand,
those who divide the world and, on the other hand, those who don’t. Nation-
alists and nomads. The two sides are incommensurable, since one side does
not allow for sides at all. This is a riddle of difference, and I think it is central
to contemporary postcolonial studies’’ (6).
This ‘‘riddle’’ also appears to be central to Miller’s scholarly enterprise,
since chapters 2, 4, 5, and 6 in this volume were written for various journals
in earlier versions. For this volume, all were revised and, in addition, chapter
2, ‘‘Hallucinations of France and Africa,’’ was extensively augmented. Added
to these revised essays are two new chapters: chapter 1, examining ‘‘Involution
and Revolution: African Paris in the 1920s,’’ and chapter 3, entitled ‘‘Revolu-
tion and Involution in Images,’’ expanding the analysis in chapter 2 of the In-
ternational Colonial Exposition of 1931 and a related novel, Ousmane Soce´
Diop’s Mirages de Paris (1937).
Miller’s goals, as he moves from the colonial to the postcolonial era, are
multiple: to expand the historiography of francophone colonial literature,
thereby correcting our understanding of its origins; to clarify the distinctions
between the colonial and the modern whose points of view have been blurred
in recent years by the critical focus on the postcolonial and the postmodern;
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to revalorize such colonial era works as Dipo’s Mirages de Paris; and to engage
in the debates centered on the curriculum of colonial and postcolonial litera-
ture as well as the debates surrounding the contemporary ideologies of criti-
cism.
The meticulous scholarship that characterizes this volume is immediately
evident in the opening chapter that convincingly challenges the benchmark
of 1932 as the beginning of black francophone literature. This is the date of
publication in France of Le´gitime de´fense, the Antillean student condemnation
of Martinican assimilationist literature. The choice of this text as a harbinger
of the birth of Negritude was made by Lilyan Kesteloot in her pioneering
study, Black Writers in French: A Literary History of Negritude, written in the late
fifties (trans. Ellen Conroy Kennedy [1961; Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 1974]). Her judgment of authors and texts was based on ideological and
aesthetic criteria that Miller finds insufficient. He rejects the support of 1932
as a turning point as well from literary historian Martin Steins, based on the
latter’s reading of African publications such as La race ne`gre. Miller invokes
other scholars, such as Guy Ossito Midiohouan, whose more realistic crite-
ria—‘‘education, intellectual and cultural life, publishing, and intended read-
ership’’—place ‘‘the origin of francophone African literature not in France with
Negritude but in Senegal with [Ahmadou Mapate´] Diagne’s Les Trois Volonte´s
de Malic (1920)’’ (13), a pro-colonial text, but the first fictional text in French
by an African (see L’ide´ologie dans la litte´rature ne´gro-africaine d’expression fran-
c¸aise [Paris: L’Harmattan, 1986]). This approach is clearly more consonant
with Miller’s concept of involution and revolution, the title of his first chapter,
which deals with strategies of ‘‘identity and culture engaged in by colonized
Africans’’ (10) in the 1920s.
In examining these strategies, Miller also puts them into an historical con-
text, namely the effects of World War I, which brought African combatants of
varied ethnic backgrounds together and made them aware of the dette de sang
(the debt of blood) owed them by the French. In addition, he cites the radical-
izing role of the Communist party. The documentation, reinforcing the re-
evaluation of the 1920s as the decade of the birth of black francophone litera-
ture, is indeed impressive. Miller brings to light previously obscure colonial
texts of imperialist, national justification and, with the exception of the Gon-
court prize-winning novel Batouala, by Rene´ Maran (1921), equally little-
known texts, mostly of resistance and principally of nonfiction, written in
French by black intellectuals living in France for the most part, where there
was, ironically, greater ‘‘freedom’’ of publication. He does not gloss over the
few fictional texts that are not anticolonial, but he clearly demonstrates that
literary activity was present and, further, that the ideological stance and the
publications of many hitherto obscure African journalists and leaders of politi-
cal groups like Lamine Senghor, Tie´moko Garan Kouyate´, and Kojo Tovalou
.......................... 9672$$ $CH4 09-06-02 14:28:35 PS
92 Criticism, Vol. 44, No. 1: Book Reviews
Houe´nou of the 1920s have more in common with the works of contemporary
activists than do those of the proponents of Negritude of the 1930s.
Chapters 2 and 3 address, what Miller calls, the shifting of French and
francophone spaces. Taking as a point of departure the present demographic
reality of a ‘‘massive’’ immigrant, francophone population in France, Miller
turns to the past to examine significant markers in the relationship between
France and its then-colonies through two cultural events: the International
Colonial Exposition of 1931 and a literary work that takes this Exposition as
its setting, Mirages de Paris. The effect of the Exposition’s re-creation of African
and Oriental settings (at times modified by the French), complete with arti-
facts and imported indigenous people, is that of a ‘‘hallucination, mirage, anes-
thesia, or phantasm’’ (56). This event created a deliberate ‘‘fog of intercultural
space’’ to which Fara, the Senegalese protagonist of Mirages de Paris, falls vic-
tim. The process of indoctrination of French values begun in colonial schools
in Africa laid the groundwork for Fara’s undoing, which was completed by the
unrealistic expectations and subsequent disappointments for which the Expo-
sition was the perfect metaphor, ‘‘the apotheosis of French colonial mythmak-
ing’’ (65). Ultimately, Miller shows that through the French recuperation of the
structures of the colonized (the ‘‘African’’ villages and/or pavilions), through
their verbal (the official Exposition guidebook) and pictorial interpretation
(the guidebook’s images of the ‘‘races’’ represented and the photographs of Ex-
position landscapes—objects more so than people), the Exposition was meant
to show ‘‘authentic differences’’ (69) in a ‘‘state-sponsored hallucination’’ (65).
To his credit, Miller is never carried way by the temptation to exaggerate
a perceptive analytical device. He recognizes that not all exchanges between
France and Africa were lost in an ‘‘intercultural fog’’ of French making. Mem-
bers of the African intellectual elite, brought to France for further indoctrina-
tion and training, were the architects of two ideological views which either
‘‘reinvent[ed]’’ the intercultural space—the Negritude of Leopold Se´dar
Senghor, which first isolated the unique qualities of the African heritage, then
arrived at universal values of me´tissage culturel (cultural crossbreeding)—or
opted openly for nationalism in the name of ‘‘Africa for Africans’’ (59).
Miller pursues the evolution of the nationalist trend in the fourth chapter,
‘‘Nationalism as Resistance and Resistance to Nationalism.’’ Displaying admira-
ble depth and breadth of research in several fields, he examines various mod-
ern and contemporary theories and debates concerning nationalism. He takes
issue, in particular, with Ernest Gellner, author of Nations and Nationalism (Ith-
aca: Cornell University Press, 1983), who accuses African intellectuals-turned-
nationalists of ‘‘false consciousness,’’ (fomenting a lie) inasmuch as they have
attempted to salvage ‘‘folk culture’’ with the language and tools of European
high culture. Miller adeptly points to Gellner’s failure to consider the reality of
the African situation and echoes the concern of African critics who object to
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the use of Europe as a ‘‘norm by which all nationalisms are to be measured’’
(128).
In examining literary nationalism in Africa, the author sees two different
‘‘moments’’ in its development: first, the generalized, pre-independence
‘‘nationalism-without-a-state’’ and second, ‘‘the reclaiming of national bor-
ders,’’ a post-independence phenomenon of the 1980s. In both cases, it is a
question of resistance, but ‘‘the object of resistance shifts’’ (121). His analysis
of the first phase, generalized resistance to colonial authority, is illustrated
through close readings of Batouala, mentioned earlier, and Ferdinand Oyono’s
Une Vie de Boy [Paris: Rene´ Juillard, 1956]; Houseboy, trans. John Reed [Lon-
don: Heinemann, 1990]). Independence for most sub-Saharan francophone
countries occurred circa 1960. ‘‘Nations’’ emerged that retained the artificial
borders imposed by colonial authorities, who were no respecters of ‘‘ethnic’’
boundaries. In the light of continued inequality and ill-concealed neocolonial-
ism that, more often than not, also came in the wake of independence, the
literary reaction to nationalism was not positive, with a few notable excep-
tions. As Miller indicates, the list of negative fictional works was too long to
enumerate. What is more, exile, generally in France, was often the lot and/or
the choice of many post-independence writers (See Benetta Jules-Rosette’s
Black Paris, a sociological study of African and Antillean writers in contempo-
rary Paris [Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1998]). Consequently, there is
the second nationalist ‘‘moment’’ which Miller identifies as one born of the cri-
tique surrounding the national culture in question. Whatever the thrust of the
criticism, it contributes to the ‘‘discourse community’’ . . . ‘‘that is specific to
that nation-state’’ (147). Therefore the question that has been debated, namely
‘‘Do national literatures exist?,’’ is no longer the issue. They do. Supporters and
detractors approve or disapprove of their existence based on their view of the
role of the state: how the state’s intervention will affect the world-standing of
its literature, and the character and quality of the literature that will receive
state approval.
While the foregoing chapter on nationalism clearly follows the subject of
‘‘the conundrum’’ posited at the outset, the presence of chapter 5 on ‘‘African
Literature and the Challenge of Intercultural Literacy’’ in this collection nar-
rows the discussion to American academia and seems justified only by the de-
bate on the teaching of ‘‘national culture,’’ understood as ‘‘one’s own culture,’’
that characterized the ‘‘culture wars’’ of the late 1980s and mid-1990s. Miller’s
knowledge of theoretical and more pragmatic research on questions of curric-
ular choice and on the evolution of critical theory itself is quite comprehen-
sive. He builds his argument carefully and convincingly for intercultural
literacy, pointing out that no culture exists in isolation. This and related obser-
vations also link this chapter to the concept of hybridity currently informing
the field of cultural studies.
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The most heated debate with contemporary ideologies of criticism comes
in the final chapter, ‘‘Beyond Identity: The Postidentitarian Predicament in
Gilles Deleuze and Fe´lix Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus’’ (Mille plateaux
[1980], trans. Brian Massumi [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1987]). It places the reader at the heart of the ‘‘riddle’’ Miller has been examin-
ing. In his introductory remarks, he comments on the centrality of the ques-
tion of identity to various disciplines, which concur increasingly with ‘‘the
theory that identities are negotiated rather than natural; contingent, con-
structed, and imagined rather than unmediated and necessary’’ (171). What is
more, some in the field of cultural studies see the construct of identity as an
‘‘identitarian prison’’ with its categories of ‘‘gender, race, ethnicity, and nation.’’
One of the theoretical alternatives offering a means of escape, that is, a means
of moving ‘‘beyond identity,’’ is the concept of ‘‘nomad thought’’ presented in
the second volume of Mille plateaux (A Thousand Plateaus). Miller quotes the
explanation given on the back cover of Deleuze and Guattari’s work: nomad
thought is ‘‘a way ‘to conceive of individuality free from the confines of Iden-
tity [that is, free from identitarianism], to think difference in itself, without
reference to the Same’ ’’ (173).
Miller’s concerns with this mode of thought ‘‘that appears to be gaining
influence’’ focus on what he calls its ‘‘underpinnings’’ and ‘‘some aspects of its
validity’’ (173). Using the English translation (which he praises highly) and the
original French (when nuances of meaning are involved), he pinpoints some
of the unclear terms in Deleuze and Guattari’s self-styled vocabulary and rea-
soning. Further, while most of their sources are in keeping with their intellec-
tual nomadism, therefore ‘‘free’’ from referentiality to actual nomads, there are
in these same sources links, via citations, to anthropological findings, namely
to ethnographic, that is identitarian, works. Consequently, in spite of the au-
thors’ disclaimer about their ideas being ‘‘prescriptive’’ rather than ‘‘referen-
tial,’’ Miller feels one cannot ignore the referential nature of their work as
revealed by their footnotes. Having made these statements about their main,
canonical sources, Miller then turns to an examination of ‘‘a number of ob-
scure and outdated sources’’ (182) that are important to Deleuze and Guat-
tari’s project. Miller concludes that the elucidation of their ideas on
nomadology ‘‘require[s] ethnographic authority’’ (182) and, therefore, is at
odds with their stated ideological position.
He reinforces this assessment in his analysis of subsequent chapters of this
work, arriving finally at the focal point of Nationalists and Nomads, Africa. His
interest is in the treatment this terroritorialized space receives (keeping in
mind that ‘‘deterritorialization’’ is one of the goals of nomadology). Again,
Miller finds Deleuze and Guattari’s sources often tainted by association with
anthropological judgments, colonialism and/or primitivism. The ‘‘pure, pre-
scriptive, and virtual’’ (198) concept of nomadism that exists in ‘‘smooth’’ (or
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open) space, without borders, that they advocate simply does not exist when
confronted with actuality. (To mention a few references: to anthropologist
Georges Dume´zil, The Savage Mind, Miller 183, 193; to Paul Ernest Joset, Les
socie´te´s secre`tes des hommes-le´opard en Afrique noire [Paris: Payot, 1955], Miller
193–96; to Luc de Heusch, The Drunken King, or The Origin of the State, trans.
Roy Willis [Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1982], whose ideas on
the ‘‘man of war’’ Deleuze and Guattari adapted, according to Miller, to meet
their own concept of the ‘‘man of war’’ [196–97]).
Miller devotes further attention to the section of A Thousand Plateaus enti-
tled ‘‘Treatise on Nomadology: The War Machine’’ in which the cycle of war
and peace, characteristic of nomadic behavior, is explained by the authors. Al-
though parallels are not acknowledged, Miller makes the case for striking simi-
larities between the ‘‘Treatise’’ and an earlier work by Pierre Hubac, Les
Nomades (Paris: Marcel Daubin, 1948), which is only briefly mentioned by De-
leuze and Guattari. An important assessment arrived at by Miller concerns the
genuine sympathy for nomads shown in both texts, but with a major differ-
ence. Hubac’s conclusions, though perhaps idealized—‘‘the war machine as an
instrument of peace’’ (202)—remain in the realm of the actual, whereas the
philosophers’ conclusions mutate into a sort of ‘‘earth force’’ which ‘‘ ‘asserts
its own powers of deterritorialization, its lines of flight, its smooth spaces . . .’ ’’
(204). So much ‘‘nomad propaganda’’ (205), says Miller. What he calls for in
his final section on ‘‘Mental Correctives,’’ among a list of recommendations, is
a ‘‘less utopian, less contradictory’’ nomadism; one that ‘‘acknowledges some-
thing outside itself.’’ Primary among concepts to be dropped is the denial of
‘‘nonauthority.’’ Instead Miller recommends ‘‘cosmopolitanism’’ as a way of
going ‘‘beyond identity,’’ one that recognizes the ever-shifting ‘‘divisions of
world space’’ and develops ways to ‘‘think through borders’’ (209).
Evaluating Miller’s accomplishments in the light of his goals, I find that
they have clearly been met. The wealth of data he has researched and re-evalu-
ated will certainly change the disciplinary approach to the origins of black
francophone literature. And while his clarifications of what is ‘‘modern’’ and
what, ‘‘colonial,’’ have not been addressed in great detail here, they are fully
compared and contrasted in his re-examination of the major concepts of the
pre- and postcolonial eras. This has involved the revalorization of many works
of fiction and nonfiction by African authors on the continent and in exile,
mainly in France, from the 1920s onward. Indeed the contemporary phenom-
enon of a major number of African migrants in France, where they have cre-
ated their own space and consider themselves part of the Parisian scene, has
caused Miller to speak of shifting spaces, making France, as it were, an ‘‘ap-
pendage’’ of Africa (16). These observations have all contributed to the over-
arching theme of nationalists and nomads, the ‘‘riddle of difference’’ so central
to contemporary postcolonial studies. In working through the elements of this
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‘‘conundrum,’’ he has demonstrated a masterful ability to engage in the
debates on curricular and ideological concepts in a variety of humanistic disci-
plines—critical theory, francophone and French literature, philosophy, his-
tory, and anthropology, to mention the most obvious. What is more, he has
been faithful to his aim of ‘‘maintain[ing] inasmuch as it is possible a visible
distinction between description and prescription and, therefore, to describe
what [he has] read without projecting desiderata onto it’’ (7). In my view, he
has done that superbly well, reserving his desiderata for his conclusion, where
he describes his own non-identitarian utopia.
Louise M. Jefferson
Wayne State University

The National Uncanny: Indian Ghosts and American Subjects by Rene´e L. Berg-
land. Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 2000. Pp. 224.
$45.00 cloth, $19.95 paper.
Rene´e Bergland has provided an insightful reading of a particular motif
in American literature that presents new perspectives for those interpreters of
American literature who teach American Studies–grounded survey courses in
high school and undergraduate college classrooms. However, one must accept
Bergland’s premise—which many, but not all, American Studies professors
do—that American ‘‘land is haunted because it is stolen’’ (9) in order to accept
her most compelling and unique conclusions. Her broad understanding of
American intellectual history informs her initial discussion of the topic of ‘‘In-
dian Ghosts and American Subjects,’’ and her frame of reference ranges chron-
ologically in the balance of the text from Cotton Mather and Mary Rowlandson
to Charles Brockden Brown, Washington Irving, and Samuel Woodworth to
Nathaniel Hawthorne and Herman Melville. In the final chapter, she engages
in a concluding discussion concerning the ‘‘Spectral Indian’’ which illustrates
its argument through continuing reference to Stephen King’s Pet Sematary
(1983) and to Leslie Marmon Silko’s Ceremony (1977). Although her informed
discussion deftly justifies the relevance both of King’s popular culture and of
Silko’s work of high culture in the same paragraph (indeed, often in the same
sentence!), her discussion of Ceremony is not as nuanced and insightful as her
treatment of earlier American writers in the text.
Writing very consciously in a poststructuralist context, Bergland focuses
on ‘‘the consistency and the centrality of the language of Native American
spectralization’’ (21). Such language has its origin in the Puritan religious jere-
miad, and such a perspective is familiar for teachers and critics who commonly
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accept the notion of the New England colonies as a City on a Hill, engaged in
a significant religious battle against the Other/Evil yet with residual guilt for
the indigenous Indian whose personhood and culture are necessarily margin-
alized by EuroChristianity. The ethical constitution of the Puritan, as Bergland
notes, is structured along the lines of an individual and cultural continuing
struggle against Satan, a dual perspective which Bergland accurately attributes
to earlier critics in American Studies, most notably Sacvan Bercovitch in The
Puritan Origins of the American Self (1975). Bergland reads in Mary Rowland-
son’s captivity narrative (1682) the very crux of this identity dilemma in early
notions of American culture, since Rowlandson represents ‘‘a subjectivity that
at once represses and requires, identifies with and despises the uncanny figure
of the Native American’’ (34). Bergland understands the spectral Indian as a
marginalized and subjugated yet haunting figure; the predominant EuroAmer-
ican culture overwhelms both geopolitically and physically, demanding exile
or co-optation, yet there is residual guilt, a ‘‘haunted’’ (34, 37 and passim) feel-
ing, in Bergland’s terms, about what the culture has done to the ghostly native.
As Bergland moves chronologically into the American Revolutionary War
period, she notes a national obsession with ‘‘North American ghosts’’ in texts
as disparate as the U.S. Constitution (1787) and the Philip Freneau poem, ‘‘In-
dian Burying Ground’’ (1787). Bergland correctly notes that as the American
Enlightenment was coalescing into a democratic country, the status and plight
of the Indian became worse or invisible or both. The insidiousness of the lin-
guistic marginalization lies in the fact that: ‘‘By means of the metaphors of
ghostliness, Native Americans, as a race, are absorbed into the white American
mind as an aspect of American consciousness’’ (48). Such absorption of iden-
tity not only denies the Indian a place in the American future; it also muddles
the various legacies of the past, since an invisible or haunted or otherwise lim-
ited identity generally forfeits any ability to convey a coherent narrative of the
past.
As the discussion moves into the early years of the American Republic,
Bergland locates in Charles Brockden Brown’s Edgar Huntley (1799) and in
various Washington Irving sketches examples of American Indians that serve
as ‘‘ghostly figures of the irrational’’ (53). It can be comforting for a main-
stream, essentially conquering, culture to have a marginalized image of what
it is not, by means of partial self-definition. Bergland sees that these writers
created ‘‘Indian ghosts [that] shaped the nation and the national literature,
constructing America as a haunted community rather than a simple imagined
one’’ (59). The American Dream thereby becomes fraught with complexity and
cultural guilt.
Moving into the early and middle decades of the nineteenth century, Berg-
land perceives in the frontier romances of Lydia Maria Child and James Feni-
more Cooper the notion that mixed-race romantic alliances are futile, self-
destructive and doomed, since such miscegenistic alliances are inconsistent
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with the accepted notion of ‘‘Indian disappearance as an inevitability’’ (64).
Writing about the contentious antebellum decades, Bergland makes one of her
most compelling observations, that ‘‘Indian spectralization is the literary corol-
lary to Indian Removal, removing Indians from American culture as they are
removed from American territory’’ (65). Investigating this corollary at length
in Child’s Hobomok (1824) and in Cooper’s The Last of the Mohicans (1827)
and The Wept of Wish-ton-Wish (1829) allows Bergland to conclude later with
authority that ‘‘Indian Removal was concomitant with American expansion,
which was predicated upon racial, territorial, and cultural domination of Eu-
ropean Americans over Native Americans’’ (150). Of course, this statement is
fraught with a number of assumptions, but it serves as a fruitful point of de-
parture from which to access some of the important culture issues of nine-
teenth-century American history, literature, and public policy.
Bergland’s pairing of Pequot Indian writer William Apess with canonical
Nathaniel Hawthorne seems strained, yet it holds the salutary effect of bring-
ing the life and work of the remarkable Apess to new audiences. Yet even
Apess is able to imagine no better destiny for his people than contemporaries
Child or Cooper, since Bergland’s reading of A Son of the Forest (1829, 1831)
also conveys the belief that ‘‘Indians are doomed and degraded and fated to
disappear’’ (128). Bergland’s chapter on Hawthorne is less convincing, espe-
cially her concluding contentions that in The Scarlett Letter, ‘‘As the novel prog-
resses, each of the main characters is transformed into an Indian, or, at the
very least, is described as internalizing Indian consciousness’’ (157). This one-
motif-fits-all-characters argument simply does not work, even if Dimmesdale
and Chillingworth sojourned briefly with Indians before the events of the
novel. The suggested equation of Hester Prynne’s Scarlet ‘‘A’’ with ‘‘Abenaki’’
seems conjectural at best and in any case in no way advances her perspective
on the text.
In the eleventh and concluding chapter, titled simply ‘‘Conclusion,’’ Berg-
land actually engages in a new discussion of Chief Seattle and the Ghost Dance
Movement then devotes the rest of the chapter to comparing and contrasting
issues of Indian ghosts and land claims in perhaps the most important Ameri-
can Indian novel of the twentieth century—Ceremony by Leslie Marmon
Silko—and in an extremely popular horror novel—Pet Sematary by Stephen
King. Bergland’s discussion allows for some insightful reflections on how
King’s novel, like Silko’s, depends for part of its matriced structure on unre-
solved land claims (even if Penobscot or Passamaquoddy rather than Laguna
Pueblo) and suggestions of spectral Indians. However, Bergland continues to
use her defining lens to separate EuroAmericans from Natives as she reads
Ceremony, reasonably citing the oft-quoted witchery story (Ceremony 132–38)
to suggest the evilness of the European worldview and the harmony and bal-
ance of the Pueblo Indian worldview. Bergland charges: ‘‘In the novel, white
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Americans are marginal, ghostly, and evil’’ (162). Well, sure, but recall that
Betonie cautions Tayo in the novel, as he likely would Bergland: ‘‘Nothing is
that simple . . . you don’t write off all the white people, just like you don’t
trust all the Indians’’ (128). One of the most frequently recurring themes in
Ceremony is that personal behavior and state of mind trump race every time.
As Bergland notes, Tayo—like so many of Leslie Silko’s protagonists (and
James Welch’s and Louise Erdrich’s and Sherman Alexie’s, for that matter)—is
a mixed-blood Indian, so his ultimate destiny, if racially determined, is alloyed
in any case.
Ultimately, Rene´e Bergland’s The National Uncanny will be appreciated by
teachers and students in American Studies who will be compelled to return to
and reflect upon both canonical and obscure texts, to works of both high and
popular culture. Although much of the Hawthorne section seems forced, and
although the Melville-Poe diversion (117–19) is too brief to be worthwhile,
the text is valuable in many respects, including her use of Arnold Krupat’s sti-
pulative definition of frontier (‘‘ ‘a social setting,’ not fixed or mappable, but,
rather, ‘a culturally defined place’ where peoples with different culturally ex-
pressed identities meet and deal with each other’’ [51]) which of course re-
writes Turner’s century-old definition of frontier and which helps to set a new
agenda with new parameters for students and scholars in the area.
Richard Sax
Madonna University

Imagining the King’s Death: Figurative Treason, Fantasies of Regicide 1793–1796
by John Barrell. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. xvii  737.
$125.00 cloth.
Of few books can one say that even though it is over 700 pages and covers
only four years in the 1790s—and within those years only an aspect of the
political and literary history—there is nothing wasted. Barrell has loaded every
rift with ore. His thorough and painstaking historical research, excellent writ-
ing, organizational coherence, and conceptual clarity make his book a truly
notable achievement.
I will try to describe Barrell’s new book. Framed by the actual regicide of
Louis in France and the sedition trials in Edinburgh in 1793 at one end and
at the other end the passage of the ‘‘Gagging Acts’’ in December 1795 and the
half-hearted prosecution in May 1796 of the anti-Jacobin John Reeves for libel-
ing the constitution, the heart of the study is the 1794 treason trials in Lon-
don. The story of the sedition and treason trials with which many of us would
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be familiar is of course the narrative in E. P. Thompson’s The Making of the
English Working Class. Thompson’s version deals little with the actual trials and
the legal complexities, concerned as it is with other matters: the political for-
tunes of the London Corresponding Society, the emergence of a radical cul-
ture, the social history underpinning the political, and so on. There are in fact
enormous gaps in Thompson’s account, so capacious that Barrell in his own
history rarely has occasion to make reference to Thompson. Barrell describes
vividly each of the three treason trials, but that is only a small part of the larger
story, which is a contest of interpretations over key words: imagine, compass,
sedition, treason, convention. And it is a real conflict; the outcome was not
predetermined.
There are an introduction, four lengthy parts, and an epilogue. The intro-
duction lays out the legal controversy, which is also a hermeneutical conflict.
The statute 25 Edward III defined treason as imagining and compassing the
death of the king; such imagining had to be accompanied by ‘‘overt acts’’ to
qualify as treasonous. Subsequent legal rulings had discriminated between the
‘‘majesty’’ and the person of the king; it was treason only if the person of the
king were threatened with death; it was not treason to threaten some aspect of
the king’s political rule; such threats might be seditious—a misdemeanor, not
a capital crime—but the weight of judicial opinion and commentary was
against what it called ‘‘constructive treason.’’ Faced with the threat of universal
suffrage and radical democracy, the government and courts tried to legitimate
constructive treason to meet the dangers of ‘‘modern treason.’’ Opponents of
the government, however, had the weight of traditional judicial thought on
their side. The plain sense of the Edward treason statute could be pitted
against the ‘‘wild’’ imaginings of the prosecutor, who tried to link nonviolent
political association for parliamentary reform with the hypothetical social dis-
order that ‘‘might’’ follow from the conflict. In this disorder it was possible that
the king could be killed; therefore, proposing conventions favoring universal
suffrage is tantamount to imagining and compassing the death of the king.
If constructive treason seems to have a tortured logic to us now, so it
struck many jurors in 1794. Also, although an anxious government was able
to pass statutes that adopted the logic of constructive treason in December
1795, the government never prosecuted anyone under the new treason stat-
ute. The government found other ways, legal and propagandistic, to combat
democratic threats—libel prosecutions for sedition and blasphemy, ‘‘taxes on
knowledge,’’ subsidies for a loyalist press, and so on. Barrell shows that the
government and the courts were manipulating the older definitions of treason
because the danger they faced really was novel. The threat was no longer from
aristocratic conspirators who wanted a republic or a Stuart restoration; rather,
the governing elite, which was numerically quite small, faced the prospect of
a mass democracy. Chapter 16 depicts vividly the angry London crowd that
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greeted the king and his parliament upon the opening of parliament in 1795,
a famine year. Even John Thelwall and other leaders of the London Corre-
sponding Society were worried about violence. The government surely exag-
gerated the physical attacks against the king—the absurd ‘‘pop-gun plot’’ and
the broken window in the king’s carriage—but there truly was reason for the
government to worry.
As an historian, Barrell relies on primary documents, contemporary re-
ports, and material in government archives. He tells a sensational story with
restraint, immersing the reader in a sea of details and 1790s references. Bar-
rell’s history is also theoretically and politically restrained. He notes for exam-
ple the obvious psychoanalytic richness of the ever-present regicide theme,
but he leaves these interpretive opportunities for someone else because he
could not do anything with them beyond what seemed ‘‘obvious’’ (p. 45).
There is little speculation of any kind in the book; the narrative rather unfolds
with a rich factual density that earns Barrell a great deal of credibility. Neither
Foucault nor Marx is allowed to simplify the fascinating story that, on its own
terms, deserves to be heard.
Barrell tells a good story, but he also pays attention to the literariness of
the historical material, the textuality of events, and the recurrent theme of
‘‘imagination.’’ In the 1790s radicals and loyalists accuse each other of having
too much imagination: according to radicals, loyalists concoct treasonous con-
spiracies out of constitutionally sanctioned political actions, and according to
loyalists, radicals go beyond customary norms to imagine illicit transgressions
of an already constituted political order. In fact, the loyalists loosened the rules
of interpretation to cast suspicion on the words and actions of the radicals
who, in contrast, urged a hermeneutical approach that discriminated carefully
between literal and figurative, actual and hypothetical, real and fictive. Loyal-
ists were aggressive readers, practicing a hermeneutics of suspicion, penetrat-
ing behind the apparently innocent text of a convention for parliamentary
reform to discover the real meaning, king-killing, republican revolution, the
guillotine. Radicals were proponents of the ‘‘plain sense’’ of words and strug-
gled against overly symbolic interpretation. Barrell shows, however, that
words are never as plain and unambiguous as either side assumes. Rather, con-
tradiction and unintended consequences are the rule not the exception. Loyal-
ists represented King Louis’s private virtues to contrast with revolutionary
public ‘‘benevolence,’’ but the radicals could also use those sentimental con-
ventions of the family to promote a very different kind of politics (ch. 1).
Burke’s words in the 1788 regency crisis come back to haunt him, as his oppo-
nents repeat to him the image of kings from divine disfavor being hurled from
their thrones (ch. 2). What exactly did the British radicals intend to do with
their conventions and political organizing? Barrell shows that the radicals were
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never a realistic military threat, but at a rhetorical level radicals were not as
moderate as they wanted to appear to be at their trials.
The literariness of history is apparent in chapters like the fourteenth, ‘‘The
Pop-Gun Plot: A Tragicomedy by Thomas Upton.’’ The spy Upton could settle
some personal scores and exact revenge upon some London Corresponding
Society members with allegations of a violent plot against the king that were
convenient for the government in 1794 during the treason trials. Upton pro-
vided a narrative that fit neatly into the government’s plans. Whether the nar-
rative was ‘‘true’’ or not did not seem to matter much to the government,
which was willing to play some tricks to gain a conviction. The guilt or inno-
cence of one of the defendants, Crosfeild, hinged over a song, ‘‘Plant, plant the
tree.’’ Did singing a regicidal song mean that the singer was himself a regicide?
Did the song have any legal meaning at all? The jury, by acquitting Crosfeild,
seemed to grant an aesthetic dispensation to the song and its singer.
The Epilogue on Coleridge’s ‘‘Fire, Famine, and Slaughter’’ is an apt con-
clusion, as the book’s overall theme has been the dangers of uncontrolled
imagination. Coleridge in the Biographia Literaria, however, argues that imagi-
nation is actually an antidote to the dangerous excesses of the body and the
passions. He had earlier—in 1795 when he opposed actively the Gagging
Acts—linked the imagination to desire, ethical actions, and improving the
world. The later conception of the imagination is convenient for a more con-
servative Coleridge who wants to make innocuous his apparently seditious
poem, ‘‘Fire, Famine, and Slaughter,’’ which was republished in Sybilline
Leaves. In the ‘‘Apologetic Preface’’ Coleridge makes the paradoxical argument
that the very figurative nature of the seditious imagining of Pitt’s death is proof
that he did not really want to harm Pitt. Imagination dissipates the energies
that fuel actual deeds, just as—so Coleridge argues—Shakespeare’s Venus and
Adonis imaginatively represents and desexualizes the eroticism of the poem.
Shakespeare’s poem is not obscene, and Coleridge’s is not seditious, thanks to
the alchemy of the imagination. The reader at this point is more than a little
skeptical of Coleridge’s argument, but Barrell has not made a simplistic case
for a merely political imagination. To have convicted Crosfeild for singing a
regicidal song would have been unjust and even preposterous, so that at least
legally there has to be some kind of aesthetic dispensation, aesthetic free space
for strong expressions. On the other hand, Coleridge’s 1817 argument sounds
merely like an excuse, not a persuasive description of how the imagination
actually works. Appropriately enough Barrell leaves the reader with questions,
problems, and points of inquiry for further investigation. As we continue the
conversation about the ‘‘imagination’’ we have also Barrell’s enormously rich
study of a political, social, and legal conflict over what and how the imagina-
tion imagined.
Michael Scrivener
Wayne State University
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The Crowd: British Literature and Public Politics by John Plotz. Berkeley, Los
Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2000. Pp. xii 263. $48.00
cloth, $18.95 paper.
The subject of this book, ‘‘the crowd’’ and how we find it represented in
six British texts, which are dated between 1800 and 1850, is a fascinating and
challenging one. In the western capitalist tradition of individualism in particu-
lar, the idea of ‘‘crowds,’’ of grouping in any form, triggers uncomfortable reac-
tions which are related to a perceived lack of control over the forceful,
amorphous anonymity of the crowd. In his introduction, Plotz points out that
new crowds emerge in England between 1800 and 1850, and that his book is
‘‘about the effects of these new crowds, riots, and demonstrations on the peri-
od’s literature’’ (2). The period’s literature is represented in this book by six
works which are dealt with in successive chapters: Book Seven of William
Wordsworth’s The Prelude (1805), Maria Edgeworth’s Harrington (1817),
Thomas De Quincey’s Confessions of an English Opium-Eater (1821) and ‘‘The
English Mailcoach’’ (1849), Thomas Carlyle’s Chartism (1839), and Charlotte
Bronte¨’s Shirley (1849). The book’s overall argument is summarized as follows:
I argue that the unprecedented and unparalleled range of observa-
tions about and reflections upon crowds in aesthetic texts comes
about because the enormous changes in the rules of public speech
and public behavior between 1800 and 1850 make crowds, variously
defined, into a potent rival to the representational claims of literary
texts themselves. Sometimes the crowd comes to embody all the
chaos that a literary text may revile and yet admire; at other times
crowds offer a variety of new structures that help a writer delineate
some future order. But every text centrally concerned with crowds
proves interested in establishing the role of literature itself within a
public discursive space at least partially defined by those very
crowds. (2)
Plotz’s penchant for superlatives and absolutes in this paragraph (‘‘unprece-
dented,’’ ‘‘unparalleled’’) is indicative of the exuberant confidence with which
he addresses his topic. This confidence works well in the initial delineation of
the ‘‘inherent unfixity’’ (7) of definitions of the crowd, but any detailed explo-
ration of the issues is unfortunately undermined by the rash, impatient con-
clusions which are drawn about the texts.
The most exciting aspect of Plotz’s thinking is his departure from Haber-
mas’s idea that ‘‘the public sphere is essentially defined by rational interaction
without contingent pressure or power exerted from without’’ (9). Instead,
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Plotz posits that ‘‘the public sphere in early nineteenth-century Britain was not
a site where rational-critical conversation either took place or failed to take
place, but the arena wherein the disputes between various discursive logics
were staged: the space, one might say, in which it was decided what would
come to count as public conversation at all’’ (10). The insight that the public
sphere is not necessarily characterized by a rational-critical conversation is a
useful one, but it needed development beyond the idea that the public sphere
is ‘‘always the product of a struggle to order meaning, a struggle at once episte-
mological and ideological’’ (10). At the end of the rather impressionistic but
enthusiastic introduction Plotz argues that ‘‘the trick, then, is not to find the
particular ideology that trumps all others, but to describe the matrix, the
shared public space, within which competition among ideologies can take
place’’ (12).
Unfortunately, Plotz’s readings did little to enlighten me about the matrix.
Instead I was greatly troubled by a whole range of problems, some of which
could be attributed to the editors and publishers of this book. Despite the
flexibility and openness displayed in the introduction, I got a strong sense that
Plotz had made up his mind that the authors of his six texts all had a serious
(and similar) axe to grind with the ‘‘crowd.’’ It remains unclear throughout the
book what exactly the perceived threat consists of, apart from the obvious one
of being overwhelmed and annihilated by the crowd. It probably does not
even matter very much, because Plotz’s teleological readings manage to distort
all texts into limited manifestos of the kind of individualism which is obsessed
with sole control over everything. Somehow, bafflingly so, these texts are all
reduced to attempts to control or even nullify potentially crazed crowds within
aesthetic boundaries, and as a result Plotz sees adversarial relationships be-
tween individuals and crowds everywhere but not very much else.
The conclusions about Wordsworth’s Book Seven, ‘‘Residence in Lon-
don,’’ focus, not surprisingly, on Wordsworth’s efforts to establish an aesthetic
realm, ‘‘a realm dedicated to the proposition that the educated reader will look
for ‘some sequestered nook’ (7, 186), available on the busiest street, and plea-
santest perhaps when the roar is busiest outside’’ (39). Wordsworth’s desire
for immersion and distance, and the conflicting emotions inherent to that de-
sire, are, however, simplified into a rather rigid control game. Because he
wants to emphasize Wordsworth’s wish for ‘‘manageable’’ (32) scenes, Plotz
refers to the Westminster Bridge sonnet, distorting Cleanth Brooks’s reading
in the process: ‘‘The ‘Ships, towers, domes, theatres and temples’ that ‘lie /
Open unto the fields and to the sky’ can be granted ‘still’ life, as Cleanth
Brooks has famously pointed out, because ‘all that mighty heart is lying still’
(6, 13–14). Indeed, this same trope of a city beautiful because dead recurs in
interesting later poems’’ (32, my emphasis). Plotz’s hasty ‘‘dead’’ conclusion is
.......................... 9672$$ $CH4 09-06-02 14:28:38 PS
Criticism, Vol. 44, No. 1: Book Reviews 105
based on the absurd equation of stillness with death. Since there is no end-
note, no bibliographical reference to Brooks, I can only surmise that Plotz has
not properly consulted The Well Wrought Urn, where he would have read the
exact opposite: ‘‘In the same way, the tired old metaphor which sees a great
city as a pulsating heart of empire becomes revivified. It is only when the poet
sees the city under semblance of death that he can see it as actually alive—
quick with the only life which he can accept, the organic life of ‘nature’ ’’ (Uni-
versity Paperbacks edition, 1960, 4).
The argument for an ‘‘inward-looking family-based sociality’’ (54) in
Edgeworth’s Harrington which ‘‘aims to create safe spaces within which ob-
jects, as well as women and harried minorities, are exempt from both promis-
cuous reproduction and deformation’’ (57) makes sense, but the chapter as a
whole is marred by a flimsy extended excursion to The Absentee. The most irri-
tating blunder is the consistent mistake (at least seventeen times over the
course of four pages) of the main family’s name (‘‘Colodny’’ as opposed to the
correct ‘‘Clonbrony’’), and I am amazed that the book was allowed to go to
press like this. Similarly, the coachmaker’s name is not Mordecai Lazarus (45)
(which was the name of Edgeworth’s real life correspondent, Rachel Mordecai
Lazarus), but Mordicai. The attribution of intentions unsubstantiated by the
plot did nothing to bolster my faith as to whether this book had been carefully
read at all: ‘‘Mordecai is the force of absenteeship itself, happy only when he
can force those of other nationalities to live away from their homelands’’ (46)
does not make sense. Equally absurd is the idea that Mordecai’s laborers ‘‘have
returned to Ireland to help bring in the Colambre/Nogent harvest’’ (46). For
the record: the book ends with Pat Brady receiving a letter from his brother
Larry urging him to return to Ireland. It is late autumn (past harvest time),
and Grace Nugent (who turns out to be Reynolds) is not called Nogent. Pat is
still in London, ‘‘at Mr Mordicai’s, Coachmaker, London’’ (The Absentee, Pen-
guin edition, 252), where Mordicai remains firmly ensconced (not a ‘‘Wander-
ing Jew’’ (49) at all), contrary to Plotz’s statement that ‘‘[a]t the novel’s end,
Mordecai’s Irish employees return to the Colambre estate, but the Jew has no
place’’ (49). ‘‘The plot is easily told’’ (45) sounded particularly unfortunate
considering the garbled inaccuracies which followed.
Both De Quincey’s texts formed a good choice, and the rarely discussed
‘‘The English Mail-Coach’’ in particular, yielded some instructive comparisons
with Benedict Anderson’s construction of nationalism: ‘‘England is united—
but not by the way of what Benedict Anderson has described as the concurrent
or parallel consumption of news distributed in identical form in a thousand
newspapers. Instead, De Quincey imagines the moment of serial diffusion
along a single line, with each English citizen corporeally connected by the pro-
jected joy of the citizen next down the line, or one hundreds of miles away,
who will receive the same tidings and rejoice in the same manner because of
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the same mail coach’’ (107). Unfortunately the conclusions are pushed too far:
‘‘Just as the crowds in Lombard Street can celebrate with greater vigor because
of the anticipated celebrations all down each line, so too the reader’s pleasure
in the first page of De Quincey’s essay is intensified by the secure knowledge
that a fourth and fifth and fiftieth page will follow—each experienced in im-
mediacy, yet each in its linear place’’ (119).
The cunning, heroic rhetoric of Carlyle’s Chartism is analyzed convinc-
ingly in Chapter Five: Plotz argues that Carlyle on the one hand denies the
possibility of articulate speech from the crowd while at the same time borrow-
ing the energy from the crowd. The idea of the ‘‘demonstration’’ (130) as the
crowd’s speech act, with its simultaneous meetings which defy local control,
could have done with some elaboration, and maybe some of the information
buried in the endnotes could have been integrated into the body of the chap-
ters. (Forty pages of notes in a small font size are rather excessive for a 193-
page book.) The final chapter on Shirley is based on the assumption that
‘‘Bronte¨ picks out the story of the 1811 Luddite unrest to make it seem that
the danger of working-class crowds actually engendered the need for middle-
class female domestication’’ (156). Judging from Caroline’s characterization in
the first half of the novel, however, I do not agree with the assertion that she
started out as a ‘‘free unattached subject[s] moving in a landscape of unclear
economic utility and political orientation’’ (157).
A bright idea underlies the origin of this book, but it has not been devel-
oped into a mature, considered argument. There is plenty of confidence and
intensity in evidence, but its pyrotechnics failed to persuade me. Most disap-
pointingly, a university press should maintain far higher standards for proof-
reading and final production.
Heidi Thomson
Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand

James Joyce’s Judaic Other by Marilyn Reizbaum. Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1999. Pp. 246. $51.00 cloth; $16.95 paper.
In James Joyce’s Judaic Other, Marilyn Reizbaum has written a lively, if
often quirky account of Joyce’s engagement with images of Jewishness in Ulys-
ses—what she refers to as his ‘‘poetics of Jewishness.’’ It is an important proj-
ect, and marks a propitious start to a more sophisticated analysis, of either
Bloom’s character or the complexities of Joyce’s philosemitism, than we have
seen until now. As Reizbaum herself points out in her Introduction, Bloom’s
Jewishness was traditionally overlooked or treated with painful literalism—‘‘Is
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he or isn’t he?’’—in Joyce criticism. The query was usually answered in the
negative, so that scholars such as Ellmann felt it unnecessary to dwell on those
questions and configurations now understood precisely to define both modern
Jewish consciousness and the diverse shapes of antisemitism (itself a phenom-
enon of modernity). To Reizbaum’s credit, she engages fully with the current
understanding—propounded by the new Jewish cultural studies—of Jewish-
ness as construct rather than given. But she neglects to specify that this idea of
constructedness—what Reizbaum calls ‘‘impossibility’’—does not necessarily
speak to either the central concepts of Judaism or to the self-definition of large
numbers of Jews. That is, her book—which is part of Stanford’s ‘‘Contraver-
sions’’ series subtitled ‘‘Jews and Other Differences’’—rests firmly (or wobbles
deliberately) on the ‘‘difference’’ side of perspectives on Jewish history and
consciousness; there is no Jewish ‘‘same’’ in Reizbaum’s poetic or cultural view.
It should be acknowledged here, however, that Reizbaum is not interested in
‘‘Judaism’’ but in ‘‘Jewishness’’—or, as she provocatively calls it at one or two
points, ‘‘Jew-ishness.’’
So central is Reizbaum’s notion of the ‘‘impossibility’’ of the modern Jew,
and of Joyce’s Bloom in particular, that her book might—and perhaps
should—have been entitled ‘‘James Joyce’s Impossible Jew.’’ The motif is un-
questioningly compelling, and Reizbaum’s delineation of Joyce’s fascination
with antisemitic stereotypes as well as with the tortured self-image of modern,
assimilated, Jewish intellectuals is a true contribution to Joyce studies as well
as to Jewish cultural studies. In a clever, surprising sleight of counterintuitive
thinking, Reizbaum argues that Leopold Bloom is believable and memorable
precisely because he represents a compound of preconceptions and familiar
images of the European Jew—the ‘‘stage Jew,’’ as it were. He is also ‘‘impossi-
ble’’ in that he is not permitted to exist. While Reizbaum does not say so out-
right, the late-nineteenth, early-twentieth century corpus of antisemitic
writings did lead, diabolically, to this very conclusion: the Jew is not a true
human, and must therefore be eradicated. Far from endorsing this view, how-
ever, Joyce, as Reizbaum indicates, continually, concertedly, and creatively in-
verted the negative definition of impossibility and made it the emblem of
endless possibility: inconclusiveness, restlessness, the erasure of damning de-
lineations. Thus antisemitism is employed against itself, and modern, secular
Jewishness becomes an emblem of modernist writing par excellence: elusive,
disruptive, uncategorizable.
Again, both Joyce’s inversions and Reizbaum’s attention to them are imag-
inative and admirable. But is it altogether fair to attribute Bloom’s credibility—
the way Joyce makes him live in the minds of readers—to his ‘‘impossibility,’’
his construction from a conglomeration of notions about Jews, whether
spawned by antisemites or by Jews themselves? What about those readers who
know nothing of such notions; why is Bloom so palpable and human to them?
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And why not pay attention precisely to those factors (dismissed, as Reizbaum
argues, by the critics who have used them to discount Bloom’s Jewishness)
that make Bloom both ‘‘impossible’’—unacknowledged as subject by either the
culture he inhabits or by strict definitions of Jewishness—and fascinating: his
uncircumcised condition, his non-Jewish mother, his Hungarian father, his
baptism, his self-conscious ruminations about all of these as well as about Zi-
onism, Jewish liturgy, Catholic liturgy, Hebrew language, and a multitude of
other vital trivia? The somewhat confusing title of Chapter 1, ‘‘The Historical
Context for Joyce’s ‘Other’ and the Thematics of Jewishness,’’ indicates that
Reizbaum’s interest lies in the vocabularies of difference that formulated the
Jew in early-twentieth century Europe. She details the pervasiveness of anti-
semitism in the geopolitical setting of Ulysses and the stereotypes incorporated
and upended by Joyce: that of the money-hungry Jew, the bloodthirsty Jew
(falsely accused of murder and even cannibalism), the self-hating Jew. The first
stereotype or libel occasions Reizbaum’s initial coinage of the notion ‘‘Jew-ish’’;
Reuben J. Dodd, the moneylender other characters think Jewish, is so only
through their crude association of Jews with usury. A teasing out of the differ-
ences between ‘‘Jewishness’’ and ‘‘Jew-ishness’’ might have been fertile; as
would a further, and more sophisticated, exploration of the complexities of
self-hatred (as first defined by Theodor Lessing in 1930 and more recently re-
examined by Sander Gilman). To call the poet Heinrich Heine ‘‘a ‘Jewish’ anti-
semite,’’ as Reizbaum does, is both inaccurate and confusing to the unin-
formed reader. Has she placed ‘‘Jewish’’ in quotation marks because Heine
converted to Christianity (in the hope of attaining a professional position from
which he was barred as a Jew), and is he an ‘‘anti-semite’’ for this same reason?
Reizbaum does not explain, and thus fails to do justice to the richness of her
own insight: that to be Jewish in modern, secular Europe was to find oneself
in an impossible position, constantly labeled and forever misconstrued; that
this notion of an ‘‘impossible’’ identity (as poignantly evinced by a figure such
as Heine) appealed to Joyce and helped shape Joycean modernism; and that
modernism itself is therefore implicated in the very stereotypes of Jews
spawned by antimodernists who associated Jewishness with modernism.
All this is implicit in Reizbaum’s opening chapters, and indeed through-
out the book. The very exuberance of her prose echoes what she sees as the
excitement in Joyce’s appropriation of Jewishness’s internal contradictions,
and her occasional breathlessness can be attributed to the vertiginous nature
of the inversions and reversals she describes. Indeed, Reizbaum carries the
reader along on the strength of this excitement, and helps us not to read
Bloom naively but to understand his character as generated both by a set of
historical conditions—the modernization of Jewish culture and the rise of
antisemitism as a sociopolitical movement—and by a Joycean poetics partly
shaped by what the author knew of Jewish culture through friends and books.
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Reizbaum details Joyce’s reading of authors as diverse as Victor Be´rard (Les
Phe´niciens et l’Odysse´e) and Leopold Sacher-Masoch (Ghettogeschichten); in the
meatiest chapters of the book, she focuses on three figures—Friedrich Nietz-
sche, Sigmund Freud, and Otto Weininger (the last truly a case study of a self-
hating Jew)—‘‘whose work has . . . instantiated a method of ambiguity and
contradiction, for Joyce’s work and for the twentieth century.’’ Before moving
to these European examples, she spends a pithy Chapter 2—‘‘A Nightmare of
History: Ireland’s Jews and Joyce’s Texts’’—on Irish nationalist antisemitism
and its ironies, pointing out that the Jews were preeminent scapegoats in a
country of scapegoats, and that this irony was not lost on Joyce. An expanded
focus on these provocative questions could contribute valuably to current
postcolonial scholarship in Irish literature as well as the new Jewish cultural
studies by forging a stronger linkage between the two areas of investigation.
One hopes, therefore, that other scholars will indebt themselves to Reizbaum
by drawing out threads implicit in her chapter, such as the affinities between
the ‘‘Jewish question’’ (a phrase she invokes briefly in the Introduction) and
the question of Irish self-definition and self-determination; Zionism and Irish
nationalism; the psychic consequences of homelessness and of the centuries’-
long annexation of one’s own home.
Chapters 3 and 4 are the most ambitious of the book, and perhaps the
most problematic for that reason. To detail the interimplications of Joyce’s
Jewish poetics and the Jew as characterized by Nietzsche and Freud—not to
mention the deeply disturbed, sadly influential, Weininger, whom Reizbaum
promises to explore in Chapter 3 but leaves for a very brief section in Chapter
4—in so short a space would be a feat even for a practitioner of concise prose.
Reizbaum’s writing is not concise, but rather an engaging, often charming but
sometimes disconcerting, combination of expansiveness and compression.
This compression is generally a virtue but occasionally leaves the reader guess-
ing at the direction of Reizbaum’s argument. She also tends to abruptly intro-
duce new terms to her discussion, as in Chapter 3, ‘‘A Poetics of Jewishness,’’
when she states that Bloom’s role in Cyclops is to undermine identity politics.
The reader has not heard about identity politics up to this point and is unsure
whether a new motif has been raised or merely a new term added to the in-
creasingly complex mix of ideas. Her summaries of Freud on the subject of
Jewish humor, in particular of the ‘‘types’’ he identifies therein, or of the de-
ranged memoirist Daniel Paul Schreber, are lively but too compacted to en-
lighten the nonexpert reader who has never heard of ‘‘Schadchen’’ or
‘‘Schnorrer’’ or read Sander Gilman on these subjects. In this part of the book
Reizbaum also introduces two other German terms, ‘‘mauscheln’’ and ‘‘Misch-
ling,’’ which are central to her discussion and highly intriguing but deployed
with some abandon (including grammatical abandon, since ‘‘mauscheln’’ is an
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infinitive and cannot therefore be used as a noun, as in ‘‘a mauscheln of En-
glish’’ or ‘‘Bloom speaks mauscheln’’). ‘‘Mauscheln,’’ referred to by Gilman as
‘‘the hidden language of the Jews,’’ is a derogatory word, dating back to the
seventeenth century. It refers to a version of German spoken at that time by
certain German Jews and suggests a mangling of the German language and an
unsavory mode of business and dealmaking talk. Reizbaum seems to imply
that Joyce’s own text enacts a version of ‘‘mauscheln’’—that is, an unorthodox
use of language and a subversion of fixed concepts such as gender, religion
and nationality. It is a clever, even a useful suggestion—but Reizbaum fails to
indicate whether Joyce himself was familiar with the term or the concept.
What makes James Joyce’s Judaic Other sometimes frustrating is also what
makes it often delightful and most certainly fruitful for further studies of Jew-
ishness in Joyce: the sheer energy and imagination with which Reizbaum lays
out terms and concepts for our consideration. ‘‘Mischling’’ is another such
term; Reizbaum declares it a trope for Chapter 4, ‘‘The Temptation of Circe,’’
and again, one wishes the chapter title had named what appears to be the
chapter’s central concept. Technically, ‘‘Mischling’’ means simply mongrel—
the offspring of a mixed union—itself, of course, a concept with derogatory
implications. Until the Nazis adapted it to refer to any person with at least
one Jewish grandparent, however, the word had no particular association with
Jewishness, and one wonders why Reizbaum uses this loose term rather than
Joyce’s more eloquent ‘‘mixed middling,’’ the funny and loaded phrase from
Circe. What Reizbaum seems to mean by ‘‘mischling’’ is ‘‘hybrid,’’ and indeed
she uses the term to refer to any and all hybrid figures; how and why the Ger-
man is particularly apt here remains unclear. Here and throughout the book,
Reizbaum falls just short of a specifically Jewish reworking of postcolonial the-
ory; because the new Jewish cultural studies has been so much influenced by
the vocabularies of Bhabha et al., this remains a tall order—and a necessary
one, if Jewish studies is to come into its own as a postmodern discipline. We
can thank Reizbaum for launching us in this direction, and hope that perhaps
a sequel or an expanded version of James Joyce’s Judaic Other will go further.
We can also hope that the ‘‘Contraversions’’ series will work a bit harder to
attract readers new to, or outside the area of, Jewish studies. Again, students
and scholars of Joyce for whom any languages of Jewishness are ‘‘hidden’’ and
unfamiliar may find that Reizbaum gives insufficient explanation to draw them
into her discussions. And any reader at all must be bewildered by unedited
sentences like this one: ‘‘That is, while Weininger was undone by the implica-
tions of his rearrangements of the concepts of race and sex, what becomes the
inescapability of the potential for Jewishness, Circe’s ‘unmanning’ has produc-
tive potential (if only by comically uncovering), making possible, whether
through sexual or linguistic error or both, Eunuch’s reproduction, father, no
less, in Joyce’s scheme, to O’Halloran.’’ After several attempts, such a sentence
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does yield meaning and rewards the reader with insight. If only Reizbaum and
her editor had spent more time over the manuscript, the finished version
might have offered considerably more in the way of fine revelations about gen-
der inversion, language, and identity.
James Joyce’s Judaic Other ends, wittily, with ‘‘A Pisgah Sight of the Prom-
ised Land’’ (Chapter 5)—an ‘‘anti-coda’’ which insists on Ulysses’ own pur-
poseful inconclusiveness and ‘‘impossibility.’’ Here Reizbaum turns our
attention to Molly/Penelope, an embodiment of the ambiguities of Jewishness
whose identity surpasses even Leopold Bloom’s for uncertainty; and, finally,
to Molly’s bed, inherited from ‘‘old Cohen’’ in Gibraltar—resting place for the
wanderer and final seat of indeterminacy. If indeterminacy seems at times to
afflict Reizbaum’s own argument, her very fidelity to a Joycean poetics is the
cause. As every member of a labeled group knows, one would rather go un-
named than pinned in place; but naming has its uses, too, if only to designate
the place where one stands at a given moment. As it is, we must welcome this
book—for its humor, its skepticism, its helpful debunking of a sentimental-
ized Bloom.
Natania Rosenfeld
Knox College

Voices and Values in Joyce’s Ulysses by Weldon Thornton. Gainesville, et alia:
University Presses of Florida, 2000. Pp. 238. $49.95.
Despite a somewhat misleading title, veteran Joycean Weldon Thornton’s
new book is a fairly traditional narrative study of the styles of Ulysses and
Joyce’s artistic designs in employing them. Joyce’s work always has and still
continues to invite widely varied critical approaches, which give his oeuvre
plenty of room to breathe, withstand any analysis, and leave open the possibil-
ity of other readings. One of the hallmarks of Thornton’s interrogation of Ulys-
ses (and that is the best way to describe it), however, is an absolutist bent
regarding the character of Joyce’s perspective towards narrative. It seems that
Thornton has thought long and deeply about Joyce’s art, but his odd conten-
tion that Joyce’s employment of narrative ‘‘styles’’ in Ulysses belies a moral im-
perative to educate his readership about the dangers of rhetoric appears to give
Thornton license to browbeat the reader into accepting his conclusions. Some
invective against classic texts on Joycean narrative by Steinberg, Lawrence, and
Bernard Benstock adds to the already tendentious tone, and in reading this
book, this reviewer felt as if he had wandered in on a heated argument fifteen
years too late, long after most of the interlocutors had left the room.
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The structure of the book, as would befit any traditional reading of narra-
tive in Ulysses, is divided into two main parts devoted to Ulysses itself. In the
introductory chapters, Thornton outlines his impressions of the historical de-
velopment of the novel, contrasting the nineteenth-century adherence to real-
ism with the modernist insistence on the impersonality and detachment of the
author. The theme of this book arises out of Thornton’s desire to locate the
modern novel within the tradition of realist fiction (as the title of his previous
book The Antimodernism of Joyce’s Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man will at-
test). More specifically, his aim is to explode the question of Joyce’s experi-
mentalism and in a way reclaim Joyce’s identity as an artist rather than as
another High Modernist reactionary against flabby Victorian prose. Thornton’s
basic point is that Joyce’s alleged experiments with style are merely a foil for
the underlying moral message of Ulysses; namely, that Joyce’s shifting between
voices serves to underscore moral themes:
Joyce’s rejection of valuational and stylistic relativism—the second al-
ternative—is a broader and more complex issue, and in a sense this
entire book is devoted to it, since I am arguing that Joyce persistently
makes value judgments about the various styles of Ulysses. But there
is evidence of several kinds that Joyce is not a relativist. One is that
Joyce’s earlier works—Dubliners and A Portrait—clearly do involve
values, including the ways that certain modes of language can para-
lyze us, and it seems plausible to see Ulysses as consistent with those
human and aesthetic values, rather than having abandoned them.
(39)
Thornton goes on to assert that among the clues that Joyce’s intent is
highly moralistic are Stephen Dedalus’s artistic grasping for a coherent out-
look, Bloom’s concerns for the other characters he encounters during his day
(not the least of whom is Stephen) and the general pillorying of hardened Irish
stereotypes, provincial attitudes and nationalistic sentiment (exemplified by
Mulligan, Deasy, and the Citizen, among others). Thornton elaborates in this
portion from his discussion of Ulysses’ latter half:
One recurrent theme of Joyce’s work, from Dubliners and A Portrait
through Ulysses, is his concern to reveal the dangers of various ideas,
institutions, and mdoes of discourse that have the capacity to frus-
trate the potential of his fellow citizens. Joyce lived in a time when
an increasing array of voices and media and modes of discourse—
nationalistic, religious, commercial, journalistic—arose to assert a
claim on people’s lives. He subsumed some of these modes and
voices into his works in order to take their measure, to display for his
readers their baneful effects. (95)
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However, Thornton’s argument, such as it is, relies upon descriptions of
Joyce’s technique as opposed to contextual, biographical or epistolary evi-
dence. In other words, the majority of the book consists of an exposition on
Joyce’s narrative technique alone, with little or no attention to the content or
context of the material Joyce wrote. The first portion of the book devoted to
Ulysses covers what Thornton terms Joyce’s initial style, which continues more
or less in the same narrative mode as Portrait. It is typical of Thornton’s ap-
proach to declare Joyce to be plagued with an unseen problem and then mi-
raculously have Joyce resolve it in his work; the principal issue in the first part
of Ulysses, according to Thornton, is that the initial style overcomes the mod-
ernist dichotomies radically afflicting the literature of the time. Thornton goes
to great pains to lay bare the technique Joyce employs in weaving Dujardin’s
internal monologue into the novel, going from sentence to sentence in an ef-
fort to walk the reader through Joyce’s prose in ‘‘Calypso.’’ This is all well and
good, and at times enlightening, but at the same time, Thornton’s claims for
what Joyce is really trying to accomplish as an artist is idiosyncratic at best:
‘‘Through its melding of these elements, Joyce’s technique achieves the virtual
inextricability of the authorial and figural perspectives—and thus (by implica-
tion) of inner and outer, individual and cultural, conscious and unconscious.
Thus, rather than sanctioning modernist dualisms, this unified style carefully
and systematically subverts them’’ (61).
Are we to understand Joyce’s emergence as a remedy to modernist frag-
mentation, or as glorious endpoint in the tradition of the English novel?
Thornton himself does not appear to be sure if Joyce is a closet Edwardian
or not. Thornton’s point about the first six chapters of Ulysses is just that—it
comprises Joyce’s subversion of High Modernism—and nothing more. It is as
if Thornton harbored an unspoken grudge against the Eliot-Pound axis that
demarcates the beginnings of High Anglophonic modernism, which occurred
wholly apart from Joyce’s artistic milieu, just as the multifarious modernisms
practiced by Lawrence, Musil, Dorothy Richardson, David Jones, Djuna
Barnes, and even Edna St. Vincent Millay did—each with different artistic
aims, techniques, and principles.
The second half of the discussion on Ulysses covers the highly problematic
stylistic territory of Ulysses from chapter seven to the end. Curiously enough,
the lion’s share of this section consists of discussions of the various chapters
in almost entirely abstract terms. The various chapters are discussed with none
of the blow-by-blow commentary that made the first part valuable, except
with ‘‘Aeolus’’; those portions that do include such expositions simply offer
value judgments about whether the Joyce’s chosen technique is any good or
not. It may be hard to believe, but Thornton offers highly subjective opinions
as to whether ‘‘Sirens’’ is up to scratch as a piece of literature. This approach
is taken to an extreme at the very end of the book, where Thornton discusses
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‘‘Circe.’’ This episode is arguably the most problematic stretch of Ulysses from
a narrative standpoint, but for fifteen head-shaking pages Thornton examines
it without a single excerpt from the text of the chapter itself (save for an ex-
cerpt from Fritz Senn’s work), and claims it to be Joyce’s crushing refutation
of psychoanalysis. This reader was left with the distinct feeling that Thornton
should not have bothered to complete this study.
On the positive side, I believe it is impossible for anyone to spend a good
deal of time and effort writing about Joyce at length and have nothing interest-
ing to say; Joyce attracts to his work a unusually creative readership, and every
new reading is more than likely to spark something new and rewarding.
Thornton’s pages on ‘‘Oxen of the Sun,’’ which is for my money the most
treacherous stretch anywhere in Joyce’s work (the Wake included), are the
most enlightening and enriching I have read anywhere, by any critic. His com-
pact synopsis of Joyce’s bearing on questions of language and medicine are a
boon to anyone who needs inspiration to tackle this difficult read, and I heart-
ily recommend that anyone with an interest in this bit of Joyceana to skip to
the back of the book to study it. The rest of Voices and Values is more likely to
aggravate than instruct.
Marshall Needleman Armintor
Rice University
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